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It is now becoming widely recognised that an efficient
and modern Telecomms infrastructure is a vital prerequisite for
economic development and participation in many modern economic
activities. Researchers in the area of Communications,
and more
recently Development Economics, have demonstrated the need for
society at any level of economic development to have a correspond-
ingly well-developed communications infrastructure. Furthermore
it is now almost common policy practise among OECD Governments to
give large investment and technological support to their National
Telecomms equipment supply industry - not only as a means of
augmenting the industrial and technological capacity of the
economy as a whole, but also as a strategic means of esta
blishing
a base in the highly competitive international Information Technol-
ogy markets. Indeed, the strategic role of the Telecomms industry
as the "cutting edge" of microelectronic-based Information Technol-
ogy is by now a well recognised fact by policy makers in the
Developed Market Economies.?
As far as the Developing Countries (DC's) are concerned
the rapid diffusion of microelectronic digital technology through-
out the Telecomms industry over the '70s has far reaching implicat-
ions. On one hand the impact of digital technology has radically
changed the international market structure in Telecomms, and also
the prospects for DC's to acquire the products and technologies
which form the basis of Telecomms infrastructure. On the other
hand microelectronic innovation has also dramatically altered the
nature and the functioning of the equipment itself, Digital
semiconductor technology has greatly expanded the range of systems
available and also introduced far greater capacity and flexibility
than previously possible with mechanical and electromechanical
technologies.
 
1) For a Communications literature survey see Hudson et al (1981). For a
narrowly economic discussion refer to Leff (1980).
2) Bell and Hoffman (1981) explain the important distinction between industrial
and technological capacity, and the considerable econamic benefits to be.
gained fram local technological capability.
3) OBCD (1981) and (198la), demonstrate the pervasion and importance of
Information Technology to the world economy.
It therefore comes as no surprise that no less than 60
DC's have established Government departments to deal with
immediate and longer-term policy issues? such as: a) how to assess
and acquire an appropriate level of industrial and technological
capacity; b) how to go about planning and expanding an efficient
Telecomms network suited to current domestic needs and future
demands of information technology; c) how to ensure that the
major MNC suppliers comply with the wider development objectives
of the economy.
One of the major problems DC's face in assessing these
policy questions is the newness of microelectronic technology,
and the consequent lack of empirical examples to contribute to
decision making and help avoid costly mistakes. With this in
mind the case of Brazil is unique among the DC's. Since the mid
'70s Brazil has invested heavily in establishing a modern micro-
electronic based Telecomms infrastructure. Furthermore the
Brazilian Government decided to eliminate as far as possible,
reliance on foreign technology sources in order to develop
its own local industrial and technological base from scratch.
Brazil's performance in achieving these two objectives clearly
provides an excellent case for study.
The aim of this paper is therefore to assess Brazil's
progress in establishing an efficient Telecomms infrastructure,
together with a strong local industrial and technological base
in digital technology. Hopefully this will not only contribute
to current policy decisions in Brazil but also provide evidence
which other DC's will find useful in their own Telecomms planning.
Given the low level of economic research in this area
Part 2 attempts to establish at the outset Brazil's overall
progress, both in terms of infrastructural growth and industrial
and technological developments. From the aggregated evidence it
is clear that Brazil's achievements have indeed been remarkable,
and that Brazil currently leads the Third World in developing
Telecomms technology.
In a effort to understand exactly how Brazil formulated
and implemented its Telecomms strategy Part 3 examines: a) the






administration and legislation - especially in relation to
regulating the activities of the MNC's operating within Brazil's
national boundaries; b) some of the main achievements in digital
Telecomms systems produced by the Government R&D centre at
Campinas. It is hoped that this substantive evidence of Brazil's
accumulation of microelectronic technology will prove useful to
other major industrialising ‘countries wishing to follow a similar
path.
Finally Part 4 focusses on current difficulties facing
the industry, in particular, the impact of the current economic
crisis on infrastructural and technological progress. Again an
attempt is made to illustrate issues of general interest to other
DC's including: problems in rural Telecomms, the importance of
small scale local industry, and Brazil's success to date in
adapting digital technology to suit local conditions. Policy
proposals and important areas of further research are detailed
at the end of the relevant sub-sections of Parts 3 and 4. A
glossary is also provided to explain necessary technical terms.
PART I - THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF MICROELECTRONIC CHANGE
Before analysing the Brazilian case it is first necessary
to briefly outline how digital technology has affected the
Telecomms industry, and the implications for DC's. It is usual
to analyse the Telecomms market in terms of two sectors. First
the carrier network or service sector which represents the basic
communications infrastructure of the country; services are
normally provided by operating companies either owned, or
strictly regulated by the state. Second, the equipment supply
sector - internationally this industry is dominated by 12 major
corporations who account for around 80% of equipment, needed to
provide all instantaneous, two-way communications - mainly
telephone, telex and telegraph.+
It is also helpful to analyse the equipment supply sector
in terms of three distinct subsectors: 1) exchange or switching
systems which account for roughly 31% of world sales; 2) trans-
mission equipment, appx. 30% of world sales, and 3) peripheral
equipment which accounts for the balance.” Technologically,
exchange equipment represents the "heart" of a Telecomms system
performing the central function of connecting and switching
electronic signals within and between networks. Transmission
systems are used to carry the signals from one geographical location
to another. Traditional coaxial cable transmission links are
gradually being replaced by more efficient digital satellite and
fibre optic systems. The remaining peripheral subsector is assuming
increasing importance with the recent spate of microelectronic
innovations, and includes all the equipment needed to support the
overall system such as telephone handsets and input/output devices
including modem and codec equipment; recent digital innovations
include such products as portable telephones, video display
units and mobile digital radio.
The rapid diffusion of microelectronic technology during
the '70s has transformed what was once a stable oligopolistic
market, into a highly competitive, rapidly changing and uncertain










by the digital integrated circuit has allowed market entry to
new competitors from the computer, office equipment and aero-
space industries. This intense competition in what was previously
a well-defined market is gradually breaking down the barriers to
entry especially in the areas of peripheral and transmission
equipment. While the traditional suppliers still dominate the
major exchange equipment markets digital technological change
has led to intense rivalry and competition. Huge R&D investments
in developing large scale public exchanges by the MNC's, often
financially backed by domestic Governments, has been the principal
means of competition.+
There are four important reasons why these changes brought
about by digital technology may in fact prove beneficial to IC's.
First, many of the MNC manufacturers justify their R&D investments
on relatively small uncommited export markets, mainly in Third
World countries.” In order to gain new markets the MNC's are
often prepared to sell systems at lower prices than payed by the
Telecomms administrations in the advanced countries. In addition
assistance in terms of cheap loans and "aid for trade" arrangements
are becoming a common means of market entry. Furthermore, the
purchase, installation and operating costs of all three categories
of digital equipment are far lower than in comparable electro-
mechanical systems. For example, installing 1 million telephone
lines today costs three to five times less than the now-advanced
economies payed 30-40 years ago.”
-A second possible benefit for DC's currently expanding
their basic Telecomms infrastructure is the potential advantage
of "leap-frogging" older, more expensive electromechanical
technologies and installing what are now well established, and
more flexible microelectronic networks. A third potential
advantage also concerned with the product technology is the
substantially greater capacity and efficiency of digital over
previous technologies. Essentially the introduction of Stored
 
1) Muller (1982) describes the large MNC investments in public digital exchanges.
See Hoffman (1981) for general discussion of Government support for
technology based competition in the OECD.
2) Section 3.3.3 below provides more details.
3) The term "line" includes all the necessary telephone equinment needed to
install one telephone line. Information from Jequier (1977) p.217.
Program Controlled (SPC) ‘technology has dramatically reduced
the cost of manipulating and transmitting information from one
location to another.?
A fourth possible henefit to DC's concerns the "modular" i
design of digital technology in Telecomms. In contrast to 4
older technologies microelectronic systems are designed to be
modular which means that a network can be built up gradually from
a range of basic modules.? At the same time the skills and
technology needed to develop and produce the technology can also
be gradually acquired. Unlike pre-microelectronic technology,
digital systems require a relatively small range of high level
design skills coupled with a wider range of low level skills -
especially in the assembly, installation and maintenance stages.
This skill configuration may well be more suited to the existing
endowments in especially the larger DC's. In comparison with
digital exchanges the older Strowger and Crossbar systems
required a thoreoughgoing technological capacity all the way
through from design to maintenance.
However in order to realise these potential advantages
an adequate level of local knowhow and skill is needed not only
to efficiently operate and maintain the network, but also to
actually choose and bargain for the most appropriate system. In
terms of local manufacture of digital Telecomms a substantial





ogy to suit local circumstances. Again, the prospects for larger
DC's attempting to gain local technological capacity from foreign \
sources appears favourable. In fact, where sales of equipment }
are linked to sales of technology and manufacturing capacity in
the recipient country, the competition for orders between the
MNC's is even more intense than with straight product sales.>
Potentially therefore there are considerable benefits
to be gained from the shift to microelectronic technology. Again
the case of Brazil is especially interesting given its large
internal market and its primary objectives of reducing dependence
on foreign technology, developing local capabilities,and providing
digital products and technologies to suit local conditions.
1) Muller (1982) provides a detailed analysis of the greater capacity and
reliability of digital Telecomms equipment.
2) See POEU (1979) for technical details.
3) This point is confirmed by the competition for the recent Chinese and Indian
contracts. See section 3.3.3 below for details.
oT.
PART 2 - AGGREGATE INDICATORS OF BRAZILIAN PROGRESS IN
TELECOMMS POST '74,
2.1 - Position before '74
Before the major policy initiative which began in 1974
Brazil's Telecomms infrastructure was largely unplanned, ineficient
and fragmented. In the mid '60s total telephone coverage amounted
to less than 1.3 million serving a population of around 74m; up
to 1970 telephone coverage remained extremely low with an average
of less than 2 telephones per 100 population. Similarly national
Telex coverage was very poor with appx. 1000 terminals to support
the whole of Brazil's industrial and domestic needs.
Until the late '60s one major foreign owned corporation
crs? was responsible for appx. 68% of installed telephones, with
a staggering 800 or so other small companies supplying the balance
of Brazil's telephone services. As a consequence tariffs varied
widely across regions and most of the operating firms lacked
any significant financial, managerial or technological resources.
With very little long-term investment taking place the
transmission network was also wholly inadequate to meet the demands
of a rapidly growing economy. Modern microwave links only
extended to 4 of the major cities, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo,
Belo Horizonte and Brasilia. Where other cities and towns were
integrated at all into the national network they were forced to
rely on inefficient and low capacity systems. It is hardly
surprising that the Telecomms network overall was frequently
subject to system conjestions and breakdowns.
The poor state of Telecomms services was compouned by an
equipment supply sector heavily dependent on imports of equipment
and technology. Four major MNC's, Ericsson do Brasil (EDB),
Standard Electric (SESA) a subsidiary of ITT, Siemens, and Nippon
Electric (NEC) almost totally owned and controlled the domestic
supply industry. Up to the early '70s these MNC subsidiaries
had developed very little in the way of exchange and transmission
technology and played only a passive role in technology transfer
from the parent companies.
1) The following information is fram SSI (1982).
2) A Canadian canpany, Companhia Telefénica Brasileira.
Furthermore before '74 Brazil as yet had no significant
Government involvement in R&D in communications technology. Except
for poorly financed and disorganised research activities, mainly
in the various universities, the country was devoid of any local
scientific and technological capacity. In short, Brazil entered
the '70s with a wholly inadequate Telecomms infrastructure,
virtually no local Brazilian industry, no R&D capacity and no
significant technological base.
2.2 - Indicators of Service Sector and Infrastructural Achievements
Following the change of Government in 1974 the poor overall
state of the Telecomms sector improved dramatically. The new
Geisel Government, sensitive to criticisms of dependence on foreign
capital and technology, adopted a strongly interventionist approach
to Telecomms based on a well defined industrial and technological
strategy. Through the Ministry of Communications (MINICOM) the
government committed itself to three main objectives in Telecomms:
1) to accelerate the expansion of a dependable, efficient and
comprehensive Telecomms infrastructure; 2) to gain ownership and
control of the MNC subsidiaries operating within the country, and
3) to build a Government R&D centre in Telecomms capable of provid-
ing an independent base in the latest digital technology, thereby
reducing dependence on foreign technology sources.
Table 1 overleaf presents the historical growth of Telecomms
coverage from 1948. After the relatively stagnatory levels of
coverage up until 1974, Brazil experienced a remarkable excellerat-
ion in telephone coverage from only 2.9m in 1974 to 9.3m today.
This raised the number of telephones per 100 population from
only 2.7 in 1974 to 7.8 in 1983. Brazil's telephone density
currently compares well with most other DC's, and is well above
the average for Latin America, Africa and Asia. By the end of the
‘80s Brazil intends to increase the present level to around 20m.2
Telex coverage witnessed a similarly rapid expansion.
By the end of 1980 Brazil had installed a fully automatic public
1) Average DC density is barely 1 telephone per 100 population Pelton (1981)
For detailed international camparisons see SSI (1982) p.39.
2) Pelton (1981) p.222.
Table 1 Number and Density of Telephones in Brazil - Selected
Years 1948 to 1983. :
 
Year Number of Telephones Number of Telephones
(Thousands) _per 100 population
1948 484 1.30










Sources: Compiled from Maculan (1981) ppl93-194, SSI (1982) p.197
Mattos (1983) p6, and Telebrasil (1981) Nov-Dec,p.6.
telex network serving 535 main localities with 53 domestic
exchanges. The number of telex terminals increased from the low
level of around 1000 in the late '60s to over 43,000 in 1982.
This extremely rapid growth in telephone and telex
coverage facilitated a large increase in the volume of Telecomms
traffic both nationally and internationally. The volume of
international telephone calls rose from 4m in 1969 to over 340m in
1980, with an average growth of over 20% per annum over the 1975
to 1980 period. Today Brazil is connected with direct dialing
facilities to 56 other nations. The expansion of overall
Telecommunications facilities both paralelled and supported Brazil's
economic growth in recent years and substantially improved the
communications capacity of the country.,
In order to support this expansion of Telecomms services
it was necessary for Brazil to invest heavily in the network.
Table 2 shows the magnitude of total investments by TELEBRAS
(the overall Telecomms operating company) over the 1976-1983
period. Although these figures are extremely sensitive to exchange
1) The following details are fran SSI (1982).
10.












Sources: 1976-1981 SSI (1982) p52 (Exchange rate o
f December
1981, $1 = Cr127.8)
1982-1983 Calculated from Telebrasil (1983) Jan/Feb.p.5
5
(Exchange rate of $1 = Cr242 as per Ministry of Comm
unic-—
ations).
rate conversions (the official cruzeiro/dollar exchang
e rate
rose from 130 in Jan.'82 to 979 in Dec.'83 over which
period
the cruzeiro was devalued 93 times) they do indicate the large
dimensions of total investments, amounting to around
$10 billion
over the 8 year period.
However, it would be wrong to suppose that these invest
-
ments represented a great resource drain to the country.
On the
contrary, operating data from TELEBRAS clearly show tha
t
Brazilian Telecomms services are largely self-financing, highl
y
profitable, and a constant contributor to Government re
source
raising. A brief review of some of the main economic parame
ters of
TELEBRAS helps to illustrate the contribution of Telecomm
s
to the economy.
Since TELEBRAS was established in 1972 it has grown to
become the igth largest corporation in Brazil in terms of sales
,
and now ranks as the second largest profit maker (in absolut
e
terms) in the country?. Over the '70s TELEBRAS has l
argely
financed its own expansion through operating revenues,
mainly
from the more profitable international and interurban serv
ices .*
Indeed since 1977 TELEBRAS has been almost completely self-
suffic-




















itself, an unusual achievement among Telecomms operating
companies internationally who normally expect to raise approx-
imately an equivalent of one third of annual turnover in the
form of fresh capital, to keep pace with an average annual growth
of 10%. (In fact Brazil's Telecomms growth was way above this
rate averaging around 18% p.a. over the 1977-1981 period) .1
Today operational costs currently run at only 48% of gross oper-
ational receipts, with a further 39% of receipts covering
interest payments and amortization on loans.
In addition to financing its own expansion, since 1974
TELEBRAS has been used as a constant source of Government
revenue for other activities. Central Government has’ consistently
diverted resources from the National Telecomms Fund (set up to
finance Telecomms investments) to other Government projects.
In 1983 of the Cr225b (appx. $370m) received by the fund from
operating revenues 77% was diverted to activities outside the
Telecomms sector. In 1984 only 10% of the estimated Fund receipts
of Cr520b (appx. $460m) is forecast to be used for Telecomms
In spite of this large resource drain TELEBRAS has
maintained an impressive rate of Telecomms expansion almost
wholly from operational receipts.
purposes.?
Furthermore the high levels of growth, investment and
profit under TELEBRAS have not been at the expense of the
consumer in terms of high prices. Since 1974 increases in
Telecomms tariffs have remained consistently and substantially
below the average rate of inflation. In 1983 local tariffs were
25 times higher than they had been in 1973, with interurban
35 times, while the general price index over the same period
increased 89 times.In the context of these extremely high rates
of inflation relative price increases become very important.
In comparison with all the major public services and products
over the 1973-1983 period Telecomms charges experienced the
 
1) 10% is the average DC Telecamms growth rate, Pelton (1980)p210. The demand
for external capital is due to the extremely "heavy" nature of Telecams
services where the ratio of fixed capital requirements to gross annual
income is usually about 3/1 - appx.9 times greater than normal manufacturing
capital/output ratios which average around 1/3. Chapius (1985) p615.
2) Information fram Telebrasil (1983) Nov/Dec. p4.
3) Exchange rates for 1983, average of Cr606 = $1; for 1984 current rate of
cr1128 = $1.
212.
lowest rates of inflation with for example, coffee and bread prices
rising 140 times, water rates increasing 46 times, electricity
120 times, gasoline 118 times and minimum wages 87 times.
Alongside high profitability and relatively low price
inflation TELEBRAS has also been a constant source of employ-
ment throughout the recessionary period beginning in 1974.
Over the period 1974 to 1976 the number of TELEBRAS employees
increased from 78,000 to over 84,000 and today employment
stands at around 97,000."
In short the large investments in Telecomms since the
mid '70s have more than realised their return. Today TELEBRAS
eccupies an almost unique position among state’enterprises in
Brazil with low debt, falling imports, no contribution to
inflation, and rising levels of employment.
Returning to actual infrastructural improvements, much
of the investment described in Table 2 above was directed to
expanding and modernising the basic Telecomms transmission
network. The updating of the technologically backward transmission
systems was vital not only to integrate the country within
one Telecomms network, but also to lay the foundations for
Brazil to "digitalise" the whole Telecomms network and thereby
meet the demands of so-called "information society".?
Briefly, the predominant form of domestic transmission
is microwave line-of-sight relays which integrate all the states
and most cities, and are now used to connect Brazil directly
with Argentina and Paraguay using high capacity linkages.
Where Brazil's environmental conditions do not permit access by
land other modern means of transmission are used. Satellite
transponders currently leased from INTELSAT cover the massive
Central East Amazon region, while troposcatter systems cover
the remote North/North East regions. In addition satellite and
1) Telebrasil (L983) Nov/Dec p7. The "sgeeze" this has imposed on the Telecomms
sector as a result of relatively low tariff increases and rising input costs
is discusses in Part 4 below.
2) Sources: Maculan (1981) pl96, Wajnberg (1982) p5, Iu (1978) p75.
3) Based on digital information technology, this sector includes Telecomms,
Telematics and Informatics, and is recognised to be the largest dynamic
source of employment and econcmic growth in the OECD countries. See CECD
(198la) especially pages 72 and 73. Also see glossary for explanation of
these and other technical terms in this section.
«13.
short wave radio systems now provide a full coastal Telecomms
service.
After microwave relays satellite is the second largest
form of domestic transmission. Brazil is now one of the largest
Third World leasers of INTELSAT satellite transponders. However,
a wholly Brazilian developed satellite is due to be launched
next year to begin replacing the relatively expensive and
infelxible INTELSAT services.* Local satellite development is
also geared towards the planned digitalisation of the entire
Telecomms network.
Satellite transmission has played an increasingly important
role in integrating Brazilian Telecomms both nationally and
internationally since 1974. Currently, satellites provide local
Telecomms links to Boa Vista, Macaro, Manaus, Porto Velho,
Rio Branco and Tangua (near Rio de Janeiro); this coverage is to
be expanded substantially over the next five years. Internation-
ally satellite links are centered around two major earth stations
at Tangua which connect Brazil directly with over forty other
countries. The current capacity of around 700 international
circuits is planned to increase to 3500 by 1993.
Although the use of satellites has grown considerably
the principal means of international transmission remain the
coaxial networks, again developed extensively after 1974. Over
the last 10 years Brazil has installed 2 major underwater
coaxial. systems. The first, "Bracan I" was developed jointly
with the International Telephone Company of Spain and since
1973 has provided 160 telephone voice circuits to Europe. The
second, "BRUS" with 1640 voice circuits began operating in 1980
to provide transmission to the United States, BRUS was developed
together with a group of corporations led by AT&T. A further
high capacity coaxial system called ATLANTIS began operating
in 1982 to expand Brazil's telephone and telex transmission
links with the continents of Africa and Europe. ATLANTIS has
two major submarine cable sections, the first with a capacity
of 1380 voice circuits and the second with 2580 circuits.
 
1) Full details of the technological upgrading of Brazil's transmission
network are given by SSI (1982).
2) Jornal do Brasil (9/1/84).
ed.
It is also important to note the impressive progress
made in providing an informatics transmission base. Essentially
Brazil's aim is to keep apace with the increasing economic
demands for rapid transmission, manipulation and storage of
digital data in various forms through the national Telecomms
network, Regarding public data communications facilities,
EMBRATEL, the operating company responsible, introduced a
comprehensive data communications service in 1980 called Transdata.
This system employs the most up-to-date Time Division Switching
and Multiplexing technology and now covers 300 localities with
over 4000 terminal points. The principal aim of Transdata is
to allow firms, institutions and private individuals to send
large quantities of data in digital form at great speed and
low cost from one location to another.
A further public data communications system, SICRAM, is
also provided by EMBRATEL for the automatic storage and
retransmission of data. SICRAM is also open for public use and
data is processed in digital form through the national telex
network and controlled by a central computer in Rio de Janeiro.
Internationally data transmission is now provided by the
INTERDATA service. An additional international system exclusively
for banking use is also currently being commissioned and due to
be installed soon.?
Together with the now comprehensive data communications
network Brazil is also developing and introducing various
Telematics systems at the very frontier of information technology .*
A public Videotext system which transmits data in digital form
through the telephone network and displays information on
television screens is currently being installed in Sao Paulo.
A further project Teletext is also underway; this system transmits
digital information via television signals and again uses the
TV screen to display information to the user.
A public international electronic mail system is already
operating in Rio de Janeiro and.Sao Paulo and shortly to be
extended to other major cities. The Ministry of Communications
 
chensive digital systems for Maritime and Air Traffic control are
also now operating through the Telecomms network SSI (1982).









is presently deciding which national corporations will supply
the hardware and software for the international electronic
mail service and the planned domestic electronic mail network.
Finally, it was very recently announced that from March this
year each household in the capital city Brasilia will be linked
by telephone to a central computer information centre, to provide
a wide range of public information services. All the software
for the network is being developed locally together with some
of the hardware, including the modems which allow the telephone
direct access to the central computer.
In short, since 1974 Brazil has not only greatly improved
and expanded its conventional Telecomms infrastructure but also
layed the foundations for meeting the increasingly important
demands of information technology.
2.3 -Indicators of Industrial and Technological Achievements
 
2.3.1 Private Sector Progress:
While details of how Brazil planned and executed its
Telecomms strategy are discussed in Part 3 below it is useful
here to present in general terms the progress to date in
establishing a viable national equipment supply sector. In terms
of ownership and national integration of the MNC subsidiaries the
new policy introduced by the Ministry of Communications after
1974, achieved three major objectives vital to technological
accumulation within the country. First, the majority of voting
capital of the MNC's has now been transferred to Brazilian
; financial groups. Although in itself ownership transfer is not
a sufficient condition to ensure local technological develpment,
this was a vital step in gaining national control over the
industrial and technological activities of the MNC's.
Second, all the Telecomms equipment purchases were
centralised under TELEBRAS under the new industrial policy. This
new monopsony purchasing power enabled TELEBRAS to insist that
the MNC's reduce their imports of components and equipment,
and use locally produced inputs and technology. In other words
 
1) Jornal do Brasil (1984) 23/1/84 pl2.
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the MNC subsidiaries were forced to increase the level of
integration of their activities within the industrial structure
of the country. Table 3 illustrates the degree of success of
this policy over the 1975 to 1982 period, with imports falling
from $249m in 1975 to around $80m in 1982.
Table 3 Commercial Balance of the Telecomms Equipment
Supply Sector 1975-1982 (millions of dollars, current
prices). .
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Imports 249 161 T77™768.8 68.5 78.1* 88.9% 79.7
Exports = 1.5 30.7 24.7 33.4 36.9 38.7 21.6
Commercial 249 159.5 146.3 44.2 35.1. 41.2 50.2 58.2
Balance (negative) .
Source: Wajnberg (1983) p22
*Increase due to introduction of SDS-SPC technology.
A modest level of exports also helped improve the overall trade
balance of the manufacturing sector from -$249m to around -$50m
over the last 3 years. Evidence from GEICOM (the agency
responsible for regulating Telecomms imports) shows an even
higher degree of success in reducing imports of the state
operating companies under TELEBRAS, with imports falling from
over $100m in 1975-1976 to only $19m in 1981.
By reducing the import value per unit of output the
indices of nationalisation increased from around 80% in 1975-1976
to appx. 90% today.” This means simply that for every dollar
of imports Brazil produces 10 dollars of local output. Although
this is a very crude measure, the Telecomms ratio of 1:10 is
easily the most successful within the electronics sector
overall in Brazil, with the consumer goods sector standing at
1:6.6 and the informatics sector at only 1:3. New rules to
reduce imports still further were issued by CACEX (the department
of foreign trade of the Bank of Brazil) in 1983, with an
extension of the list of prohibited Telecomms imports. Latest
estimates indicate a reduction of imports of 22% in 1983 in
1) Wajnberg (1982) pé.
2) Calculated fran Wajnberg (1982) and (1983).
ol?
relation to 1982.7
The third major achievement of Telecomms policy after
1974 is the substantial degree of local technological development
by the MNC's within Brazil's national boundaries .” This
ocurred a) as a direct consequence of the rules regarding
the "Brazilianisation" of technology imposed by TELEBRAS
(combined with the competition between the MNC's for new orders),
and b) asanindirect result of theimportreductions imposed
on the MNC's which necessitated a degree of local technological
development to substitute domestic inputs for previously imported |
Oxuee.
In fact the post '74 policy gave rise to a further
important phenomenon - the rapid growth and participation of
small scale firms of Brazilian origin supplying equipment,
components, and materials for the Telecomms network, By 1982
the number of small and medium scale Brazilian firms had
reached 120, supplying appx. 17% of total equipment supply needs.
The vital technological role played by these firms is analysed
in Part 4.3, suffice to mention here that some of the larger
units have already moved up the scale of technological complexity
and are now actively involved in developing digital exchange
technology in conjunction with TELEBRAS.
2.3.2 Government Sector Investments:
Together with directing the activities of the private
sector Brazilian state enterprise has also successfully embarked
upon an ambitious programme of local technological development,
principally under the major new R&D centre in Campinas (CPqD).
Since 1976 CPqD has been engaged in developing digital technology
right the way through from basic design research, to transferring
technology to local industry. Through these state R&D activities
Brazil has succeeded in mastering microelectronic technology
in all three areas of exchange, transmission and peripheral
equipment ,*
Table 4 below shows TELEBRAS's investments in R&D over
1) Telebrasil (1.983) March/April p21 presents the response by the supply
industry who believe this to be unfair treatment.
2) Again detailed below Part 3.3.
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the period 1977 to 1983; again it is important to note the
extreme sensitivity of exchange rate conversions especially for
1982 and 1983.
Table 4 Investments in R&D by TELEBRAS, 1977 to 1983
(millions of dollars, current prices)*
Year Investments








Sources: 1977 to 1981 SSI (1982) p53
1982 Telebrasil (1982) Nov/Dec p78.
1983 Telebrasil (1983) Nov/Dec p4.
a) Exchange rates for 1977 to 1981 as per TELEBRAS, rate of Jan.
1981 Cr65.5 per dollar. Exchange rates for 1982 and 1983
calculated as an average from official Central Bank Statistics,
1982 Cr183.6 per dollar, 1983 Cr606.5 per dollar.
b) Includes land, construction of buildings and acquisition of
real estate and equipment.
The main point to note is the relatively low levels of
R&D investment in relation to total investments by TELEBRAS
(appx. 3%), and in relation to gross operating revenues of
TELEBRAS.> TELEBRAS policy is to invest around 1% of operational
receipts in R&D - far lower for example than the major MNC's
expect to invest in R&D internationally.? If we compare the
R&D investments say for 1983 (Cr8.3b) with resources diverted
from the National Telecomms Fund» for other purposes (cr150b) 3 =
finances diverted amount to 18 times TELEBRAS's total investment
in R&D. In other words, establishing a local technological
 
1) Calculated as a yearly average from Tables 2 and 4 above.
2) Estimates vary between 5% and 10% depending on the Corporation see
Muller (1982) for discussion.










"backbone" in digital Telecomms in no way amountedto an
insupportable resource burden for either the Telecomm sector
or the economy as a whole.
Despite these comparatively low levels of investment
TELEBRAS has built up a large and successful centre for develop-
ing microelectronic technology. CPqD now has around 900 regular
employees, 700 of whom are directly involved in research. To date
CPqD has developed virtually from scratch a range of digital
exchange systems designed not only to suit Brazil's tropical
climate, but also the particular types of telephone traffic
conditions found in the various regions. CPqD's close relations
with industry has enabled technology transfer and joint development
with local firms in exchange, transmission and peripheral Telecomms
technology.
Also worth nothing here is CPqD's development of a complete
fibre optic transmission system using the most sophisticated
digital multiplexor and laser technology. This technology has been
transferred to local industry for production and field tests
are also currently underway in Rio - making Brazil the first
Third World nation to successfully design, develop and install
an integrated optical fibre system. CPqD is also responsible
for the development of the indigenous satellite to be launched
next year which will play a vital role in providing Brazil's
remote regions with telephone and TV facilities.
From CPqD's creation in 1976 it has become established
as a successful high level R&D institution well integrated into \
the industrial and technological structure of the country.Government
estimates show that systems developed by CPqD already supply
appx. 15% of Brazil's total Telecomms market, and 50% of all
future TELEBRAS orders have been reserved by law for cpqp.?
2.3.3. Summary:
There can be little doubt that in the areas of industrial
and technological progress in digital Telecomms Brazil now
leads the Third World, largely as a result of the policies
 
1) Again detailed below Part 3.3.
2) SSI (1982), and Brundenius and Goransson (1982) p23.
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adopted after 1974.1 Brazil's Government R&D centre has played
a central role in c:ordinating technological progress in
Telecomms, and ensuring that a “technology gap" does not occur
between Brazil and tte developed market economies as a result
of the diffusion of microelectronic technology. From a
technologically backward and wholly inadequate Telecomms infra-
structure Brazil has achieved a massive improvement in the
coverage and quality of Telecomms services and provided the
foundations for meeting the demands of modern information
technology. Brazil's shift from a position of acute technological
dependency to dynamic technological progress may well hold
lessons for other larger DC's which hold national autonomy in
Telecomms technology as a high priority. What follows is
therefore a detailed assessment of how this progress was made
in such a short period of time.
 
1) For the relative technological backwardness of other major DC's see for
example the cases of India (Hobday 1982) and Mexico (Tigre 1983).
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PART 3 - THE STRATEGY OF TECHNOLOGICAL ACCUMULATION
The aim of this section is to illustrate exactly how
Brazil established its base in Telecomms technology and to
describe in detail some of the major technological achievements
to date. Section 3.1 begins by examining the uncompromising
policy objectives after 1974 and goes on to discuss the
legislative, administrative, and financial steps taken to
ensure these aims were met. Section 3.2 focusses on Brazil's
efforts to direct the industrial activities of the MNC's to
ensure local technological development began at the level of
the firm. Finally Section 3.3 analyses the means by which
direct Government investment in the R&D centre CPqD, was
used to develop a strong autonomous base in digital Telecomms
technology. From the overall evidence it is clear that
Brazil's shift from a position of severe technological dependency
to substantial technological accumulation was the result of
the innovative and offensive technology strategy adopted
after 1974.
3.1 Planning Objectives, Legislation, Administration and
Finance
Two equally important and complementary areas of policy
were defined and legislated for in the post '74 period. The
first concerned the service sector and establishing a modern and
efficient Telecomms infrastructure. The notions of National
Security and the integrated Nation State were fundamental not
only in the initial high priority given to Telecomms, but also
in the subsequent decision to begin installing the most \
sophisticated microelectronic-based technological systems. \
Brazil's infrastructural objectives therefore involved, on the
one hand detailed planning to integrate the various diverse
regions of the country, and on the other a detailed strategy
towards implementing the very new and rapidly changing digital
systems.
The second policy objective, not only closely linked
but fundamental to the first, was to establish a strong
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autonomous industrial and technological base in order to
supply the necessary equipment and components for the infra-
structural expansion. This objective involved a two part
strategy of: 1) indirect Government intervention to establish
ownership and control over the activities of the MNC's within
the country to ensure local technological development, and
2) direct Government intervention in building from scratch a
major State R&D centre to dominate the main areas of digital
Telecomms technology.
Furthermore a conscious decision was taken in 1976
to begin the “digitalisation" of the Telecomms network. By
building a major industrial and infrastructural base in digital
technology the advantages of "leapfrogging" the older, less
flexible, and more expensive electromechanical technologies
could be gained. These early decisions provided the groundwork
for later policy regarding the Informatics sector and especially
the control of data processing within Brazil's national
poundaries.? However, at the time the immediate motivation
was to reduce the high level of dependence on foreign imports
of equipment, components and technology. Policy towards
Telecomms therefore followed the general shift in economic
policy towards greater import substitution and local technological
development of key infrastructural and capital goods industries,
adopted by the new Geisel Government in 1974.2
3.1.1 Infrastructural Planning, Administration, and Sources
of Finance:
Although the rapid expansion of the Telecomms network
began after 1974, efforts to organise and finance the service
sector had already begun in the late '60s, Under the new
Ministry of Communications (MINICOM) established in 1967,
CTB, the Canadian owned operating company.which provided the
bulk of Telecomms services was nationalised. In order to provide
finance for the network, Minicom introduced a novel "self-
capitalising" scheme whereby potential telephone customers
 
1) SST. (1982).
2) ‘These principles are expressed in Brazil's Second Natinal Plan and Second
Basic Plan for Scientific and Technological Development for the period
1975 to 1979,
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were obliged to "subscribe" to the telephone company in order
ro receive a telephone. Given the large existing demand for
telephone installations this served the dual purpose of
registering current demand for planning purposes, and raising
resources for investment.
In 1972 TELEBRAS was created and granted complete
monopoly power over Telecomms services under the constitution.
TELEBRAS was also given jurisdiction over EMBRATEL, the
Brazilian operating company responsible for international and
interurban Telecomms traffic established earlier in 1965.
TELEBRAS immediately began centralising and reorganising the
fragmented service sector by setting up one operating company
for each State. By 1973 twenty five regional companies were
established and operating under the central authority of
TELEBRAS. Tariffs were standardised across regions and the
rapid growth of the overall network was planned.
Two further means of finance raising were introduced
by TELEBRAS - again both from internal sources. First, EMBRATEL
was obliged to transfer appx. 80% of international Telecomms
profit to the Brazilian Telecomms Fund. Second, TELEBRAS
allowed the operating companies capital earnings of up to 12%
(ie over and above operating and capital costs).
By centralising the organisation and financing of
Telecomms nationally, TELEBRAS was also able to plan for the
integration of the various regions and rural areas lacking
sufficient infrastructure. Areas of low profit, mainly the
remote and rural areas were to be subsidised by the more
profitable international and interurban traffic. At the same
time regional cross-subsidisation became possible, and high
profit and high productivity regional companies were obliged to
contribute to the infrastructural development of the less
profitable regions.°
1) See Pelton (1981) p219.
2) Details from SSI (1982).
3) Section 4.2 below describes the problems encountered in this area due
to the economic crisis and subsequent investment restrictions imposed
on the sector.
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3.1.2 Legislating for Local Industrial and Technological
Development
Comprehensive legislation was introduced both to
strenghthen the new administration under MINICOM and to translate .
the broader Telecomms objectives into policy rules for action.
Within the extensive and detailed legislation of the post '74
period it is possible to identify three main laws which
expressed and defined Brazil's industrial and technological f
policy. The first of these laws, No 102 of Jan. 1975 defined
the TELEBRAS philosophy regarding increasing local technological
capacity and reducing dependence on foreign sources of technology.
In addition Law 102 gave MINICOM the authority to begin
identifying and deploying the available technological resources
within the country, principally in the universities but also
in other R&D institutes and private industry. Thus even before
CPqD was created, TELEBRAS was able to begin marshalling local
components, and equipment inputs.
Shortly afterwards in August of the same year the second
major Law, No 661, was passed to establish exactly how the
Brazilian takeover of the market was to proceed. On the one
\ hand this involved defining the choice of technology to be
developed under CPgD, and on the other how the activities of
the MNC'swere to be subordinated to Brazil's National Telecomms
policy. Under Law 661 TELEBRAS was to use its newly granted
monopsony purchasing power as a means, to establish control >
over equipment production and technology. By concentrating
purchasing power previously decentralised, TELEBRAS was able
to insist that the major MNC subsidiaries transferred majority
ownership to Brazilian capital, and most importantly begin
developing technology locally. The MNC's were only permitted
to continue manufacturing electromechanical systems in the short
term, and in order to compete for the large new orders on offer
had to begin immediately developing SDS-SPC digital exchange
technology, according to standardised specifications issued by
 




Law 661 also gave TELEBRAS the mandate to set up CPqD
to develop digital systems from the basic research stage
‘through to prototype development, and transfer of technology
to local industry. 40% of the local market was reserved for
technology developed at CPqD (later increased to 50% under a
further Law No.215). Againthis was a deliberate measure to
strengthen the overall economic and technological bargaining
position of TELEBRAS in relation to the 4 major MNC's.
The third major Law No.622 of June 1978 complemented
and updated the first 2 Laws. Law 622 reaffirmed the rules
for nationalisation of inputs to the sector. GEICOM, the
institution created in 1975 under MINICOM, was given the power
to coordinate the reduction of Telecomms imports and to ensure
the progressive nationalisation of equipment, raw materials and
component inputs.+ Law 622 also contained more specific
measures to assist local capital towards technological self-
sufficiency and provided facilities for developing human capital
resources,
To sum up, under MINICOM Brazil set about identifying,
planning, and allocating local technological resources to
ensure the development of a national Telecomms industry. In
terms of investment resources the expansion of Brazil's Telecomms
network was designed to be self-financing from the ouset.
By adopting a well defined and offensive technology strategy
Brazil was in a position to begin directing the activities of
the MNC subsidiaries and also build its own local base in
digital Telecomms technology. Alongside the planning and
legislation. introduced after 1974 the principal means by which
Brazil intended to bargain with the MNC's was by strengthening
the State institutions responsible for executing Telecomms policy -
thus, through the purchasing power of TELEBRAS Brazil could
insist that technological activities were actually located
within the country.
 
1) Part 2 above described the overall success of GEICOM in this area.
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3.2 Technological Development and the MNC's
 
In order to understand the extent of industrial and
technological integration of the MNC's in Brazil it is important
to view progress in this area in historical terms. Indeed,
control over the MNC's must be seen as a long-term process
of bargaining for industrial and technological transfer with
achievements and setbacks, continuing up to the present day.
Unlike State enterprise in Telecomms, the MNC's have
been supplying equipment in Brazil for over 80 years. As Table 5
shows, except for NEC, the MNC's began their operations before
or just after the turn of the century with the establishing
of simple sales offices:
Table 5: Principal Activities of Telecomms MNC's in Brazil-
Starting Dates:
 
Firm Name Sales Offices Import Assembly Manufacturing
Subsidiaries
Siemens 1895 1905 1958 end of the 1960s
Ericsson before 1900 1924 1955 1955
Philips* 1920 1925 1949 =
SESA/ITT before 1908 1926 1942 1965
NEC = 1966 - 1969
Source: R.S. Newfarmer, in Maculan (1981) pllé6.
*Philips were to drop out of the major equipment market during
the 1970's.
As the internal market began to grow the sales and distribution
offices were expanded and greater commercial representation
introduced by the parent companies, in their competition to
supply the local equipment market. At this time the main buyer
 
1) For details see Maculan (1981) ppll6-117.
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CTB was licensed by the Government to purchase imported
equipment necessary for the Telecomms network.
This situation persisted up to the 1950s when the
Vargas Government cut CTB's import quotas and placed general
restrictions on imports. In the general climate of import-
substitution at this time the MNC's were forced to begin
locating assembly facilities in Brazil to remain in the market.
Later on in the 1950s a special Government Commission into
Telecomms also insisted that the MNC's should use locally
produced inputs wherever possible.
Led by Ericsson, the MNC's responded by locating
manufacturing facilities in Brazil, beginning with simple
peripheral equipment and then moving into the production of
transmission systems. By 1957 Ericsson had already begun to
locally manufacture Crossbar exchanges to gain a competitive
advantage over Siemens and sesa,2
Even during this early period it is therefore possible
to identify the role of Government policy in directing the
activities of the MNC's - at this stage principally through
fostering competition amongst them. Nevertheless it is also
important to recognise that the core technology necessary for
the design and manufacture of exchange systems remained
exclusively with the parent companies abroad. The Government
played no active role in local development in Telecomms but
was solely concerned with reducing imports under the general
programme of import-substitution.
The next phase of Telecomms development began after
the military takeover of 1964. Again led by Ericsson the
Telecomms sector followed the general "economic miracle"
pattern of rapid unchecked expansion of MNC investment. Over
the 1967 to 1973 period of economic boom the MNC's greatly
expanded their local manufacturing activities to meet the
increased demand for Telecomms equipment.” Again technology
was transferred only when needed to support the manufacture
of the electromechanical Crossbar systems but very little in
1) Brundenius and Goransson (1982)
2) ibid for details.
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the way of local development took place.
By 1974 at the end of the boom period, like many other
industries in Brazil the Telecomms sector entered a period of
crisis of overcapacity, falling demand, growing financial debt
and redundancies. To make matters’worse the laissez-faire
policy towards the MNC's had resulted in acute technological
dependency. The local subsidiaries lacked any substantial
capacity in R&D or product modification technology. The equip-
ment sector was almost totally owned and controlled by the
four major MNC's, Ericsson, Siemens, SESA and NEC. Indeed the
concentration of foreign capital in this sector (over 90% of
| total sales) was even more pronounced than in the overall
Electrical and Electronic sector where MNC's accounted for
appx. 77% of total sales.+
It is within this context that MINICOM formulated its
industrial and technological strategy after 1974. Initially
the "Brazilianisation" rules contained in Law 661 of 1975 were
resisted by the MNC's who continued with the production of
electromechanical exchange equipment.” In order to overcome
the reluctance of the MNC's to transfer SDS-SPC exchange
technology, TELEBRAS eventually threatened to cancel outstanding
orders. By 1977 the MNC's had begun to comply with the
ownership and technology transfer directives in order to win
the. new orders on offer.
In terms of ownership a progressive transfer of voting
capital from the MNC subsidiaries to large Brazilian financial
groups began. Ericsson with a 40% market share pursuaded two
financial groups, Monteiro-Aranha and Atlantica Boavista, to
form a holding company MATEL to take over the majority of
Ericsson's voting capital.? This deal was eventually approved
in July 1979 and as a result Ericsson won the largest order on
offer and agreed to transfer their AXE-10 SDS system technology
to Brazil. Siemens with roughly 14% of the market sold a
majority share to Hering, another Brazilian holding group,
1) See Newfarmer (1979) and Epstein and Mirrow (1977):
2) Earp (1982) pll8.
3) Brundenius and Goransson (1982) provide full details of the Ericsson
case.
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forming a new company Equitel - again to compete for the f
new digital exchange orders. SESA and NEC with 38% and 53 ha
market shares respectively, both sold a majority of voting
capital to BRASILINVEST.
Clearly the new monopsony purchasing power granted to
TELEBRAS was instrumental in pursuading the MNC's to transfer
company ownership to Brazilian capital. This process of
bargaining and manoevering over the 1975 to 1979 period also
applied to the transfer of technology to the subsidiaries.
Detailed research by Brundenius and Goransson (1982)
shows clearly that in order to gain market shares in Brazil
Ericsson (also called EDB - Ericsson do Brasil), reorganised
their management structure and negociated a new agreement with
their parent company for the transfer of digital SDS technolocy.
In order to compete with the SESA Metaconta, NEC's D-10, and
Siemens EDS system, Ericsson set up a new technology directorate
to organise the transfer and local development of digital
SDS technology in Brazil. Alongside these developments in
exchange technology Ericsson also set up departments to evelop
component and material inputs as well as an informatics
sub-division.
At the time of the ownership negotiations Ericsson
bargained for a new technology agreement with its parent company
LME in Sweden. The negotiations were complex and involved
Ericsson do Brasil, LME, TELEBRAS and MATEL. Unlike previous
technology contracts this agreement involved a substantial
transfer of the core technological elements of the central
exchange system. TELEBRAS used the opportunity of a large new
order of 800,000 lines to supply Sao Paulo over the 1982 to
1986 period, to insist that the AXE-10 SDS technology was in
fact developed in Brazil. The contract covered exchange, trans-
mission, and some peripheral equipment and included; a) full
technical specifications and design information, b) extensive
training in design, engineering, manufacture and installation,
and c) other information essential to financing, marketing
and purchasing, including details of components and machine
tool suppliers together with necessary information on marketing
channels.
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Interestingly, the terms of this thoroughgoing technology
contract were far superior to former agreements. Not only was
the overall cost substantially lower, but two important clauses
- patent rights and trade mark rights - were granted completely
free.
The negotiations under TELEBRAS succeeded in acquiring |
all the necessary software and hardware technology vital for
research, design and development of microelectronic SDS technology. b
Training for Ericsson employees in Brazil constituted the
largest cost component of the contract, followed by direct
technical assistance for production start-up, and disembodied
technology in the form of specifications and documents. The
clear superiority of this contract reflected the direct -
‘involvment of TELEBRAS in the negotiations and the application
of their own technical and managerial knowhow to the bargaining
process.
In 1980 however a major policy change occurred. It
became evident that the SDS (space division switching) technology
was rapidly becoming obsolete. TELEBRAS therefore suspended
all outstanding orders, except for Ericsson's Sao Paulo contract,
and began negotiations for the transfer of the new, higher
capacity, TDS (time division switching) technology. ITT/SESA,
formally with a large share of the market supplying Rio de
Janeiro, showed no interest in developing TDS technology locally.
In September 1981 ITT allowed BRASILINVEST to buy the total
of their capital and in effect dropped out of the market -
leaving the competition for the other 3 MNC's, Ericsson, -
Siemens/Equitel, and NEC. ‘
Siemens/Equitel took this oportunity to attempt to
regain a greater share of the market. Having previously lost b
ground to Ericsson and been relegated to the much smaller
regional market of Curitiba (south of Sao Paulo) Siemens (now
called Equitel) also began following a technology based strategy
to gain an increased market share.
Although the evidence for Equitel is far less conclusive
than Ericsson, there are strong indications here too of local
technological progress in response to the Brazilianisation rules
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both before 1980 and after. After 1976 Equitel (then Siemens)
began introducing technology to adapt private and public
exchanges developed by Siemens in Munich and succeeded in
developing a series of products not in the parent company range.
Also in response to the Brazilianisation rules, Siemens began
a systematic replacement of imported for locally produced inputs,
involving substantial technology training from Germany. This
involved extensive product redevelopment as simple substitution
of imports was rarely possible. Today appx. 93% of public
exchange and 98% of private branch exchange equipment is of
national origin.?
After the local technology training programme a large
proportion of the German engineers returned home and were
replaced by Brazilian engineers. Currently, only 5 engineers
at Equitel are German with none at directorate level. As far
as local product development is concerned Equitel participated
in a consortium with 4 other Brazilian based companies (ABC-
Teletra, Sitelta, Induco, and Siecom) to develop small central
exchanges for Brazil's rural areas. Some of the new products
developed by Equitel are now being exported to other Latin
American countries.
Following the shift to TDS technology, Equitel embarked
upon a new major technology-based strategy to gain a larger
share of the future exchange market. Again this involved a
programme of joint technology development, this time headed by
the largest national Telecomms firm Elebra. In January 1983
the two parties signed an agreement authorised by MINICOM for
the joint development of medium scale public TDS exchanges in
conjunction with cpqp.? Clearly, from the point of view of
Equitel this strategy is designed to regain a larger share
of the major Brazilian exchange market.
This process of technology bargaining and competition
for market shares therefore continues. At present it appears
 
1) Industry interviews and Telebrasil, various issues.
2) Calculated as per GEICOM nationalisation indices. Telebrasil Nov/Dec.
(1983) p48.
3) Companhia Docas de Santos (1982) Annual Report.
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that the three major corporations Ericsson, Siemens and NEC
will remain in the competition for the major exchange segment
of the market. By 1985 Brazil plans to introduce its own
TDS technology and intends to supply 50% of the local market,
as allocated by Law 215 of June 1981. Whether or not the new
technology strategy adopted by Siemens will lead to a restruct-
uring of market shares remains to be seen.
3.2.1 Implications: Bargaining for Local Technological
Capabilities.
Historically there can be no doubt that the MNC's in
the Brazilian Telecomms market have progressively become more
and more integrated into the industrial and technological
structure of the economy. From simple sales offices, through to
assembly units, the subsidiaries are currently developing
technology within Brazil - in some cases in cooperation with State
enterprise and new firms of Brazilian origin.
The latest phase of MNC integration illustrates the
difficult and complex process of bargaining involving setbacks
and successes, with resistance by the MNC's on one hand and
various forms of Government pressure on the other. The_
international diffusion of microelectronic technology during
the '70s and the subsequent increase in MNC competition for
Third World markets, placed Brazil in a better position to
bargain for genuine technology transfer. At the same time the
strengthening of MINICOM's own administration and their
insistence on transfer of ownership and technology as a pre-
requisite for remaining in the market, gave further momentum
to local technological progress within Brazil's national
boundaries.
In response to the dual pressure of intensified
international competition and the TELEBRAS Brazilianisation
rules, local technological development is currently being
employed as a means of Multinational corporate competition.
This strategy is clearly illustrated by the willingness of the
1) Interviews suggest that the other major, NEC, has not yet joined in this




subsidiaries to: a) restructure their organisations to
produce technology locally, and b) collaborate with State
enterprise and national firms to develop the highest level
TDS digital exchange technology. In short, the Brazilian Telecomms
industry illustrates an important new phenomenon in DC industrial
technology studies - the use of local technological development
as a means of corporate competition,
3.3 Government Direct Investments in Technology
Alongside the strategy of technological aquisition
through the MNC's the Government also embarked upon a long-term
investment programme in its own R&D centre at Campinas (CPqD).
The level of investment and the general size and scope of
CPqD were outlined in Part 2. However to appreciate the
fundamental long-term role of CPqD in organising, choosing,
and developing technological resources it is helpful here to
examine a) how CPqD functions as the centre of local technolo-
gical accumulation in Telecomms, and hb) some of the major
achievements in digital technology since its creation in 1976.
3.3.1 CPqD as the Centre of Local Technological Accumulation
in Telecomms:
The overall aim of State investments in Telecomms was
to reduce dependence on foreign sources of technology and to
establish Brazil as a major producer of digital electronic
systems. CPqD was to be the principal means by which TELEBRAS
could identify and deploy Brazil's existing technological
resources at the outset. In the planning stage over the period
1972 to 1976, TELEBRAS conducted a series of meetings and
established formal agreements with the universities and other
institutions involved in Telecomms related research. The aim
was not only to define existing activities being carried out,
but also to officially set up and fund various research projects
1) For a full discussion of the institutions involved see Albuquerque and
Waldman (1980) pp44-62; for a listing in English see Galli (1982) pp 35-
38. Tapia discusses the early meetings conducted (1983).
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and begin planning for the human capital resources needed to
master the technology. In 1976 CPqD took over this coordinating
role, and in addition the main responsibility of developing
the new digital systems through from the basic research and
design stages to the development and transfer of technology
to industry.
Table 6 describes the distribution of R&D activities as
originally planned by CPqD and TELEBRAS:
Table 6: Distribution of R&D Activities in Telecomms
According to the CPgD/TELEBRAS Plan.
R&D Activities Groups Responsible
Basic Research Universities and Centres of Research
Applied Research Universities, CPqD, and other Centres
of R&D
Prototype Development CPqD, other Centres of R&D
Product Development Industry (eventually CPqD and other
Centres of R&D)
Adaptive Development CPqD, other Centres of R&D, and
Industry
Source: Albuquerque and Waldman (1980) p3.
Essentially, basic research was to continue within the Univers-
ities but under the coordination and financial umbrella
ofTELEBRAS.Applied research and prototype “development
was to be conducted by CPqD, with the option of contracting
out work to other institutions if necessary. Under the new
authority of TELEBRAS, CPgD could also choose which firms
were to collaborate in the design and eventual manufacture
of the products - an extremely important task, given that 50%
of the future market was allocated by law to systems developed
by CPqD.  
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From the early philosophy of CPqD the vital role of
the Government sector is clear. Under TELEBRF3, CPqD was the
means by which local technological activities were to be
identified, organised, financed and expanded. By integrating
CPqD into the industrial structure of the courtry TELEBRAS
could begin exercising control over the equipment supply
sector and fulfil its mandate of supporting the growth of
local firms. At the same time CPqD was to function to feed
back the infrastructural demands for products and technology,
through to the universities and R&D institutes for basic and
applied research. Bysubjecting the universities and R&D
institutes to CPqD's overall technology planning, Brazil could
also begin taking over the important "choice of technology"
decision, previously under the sole direction of the MNC's. \
Initially CPqD's choice of technology was determined
by the Government's aim of gaining self-sufficiency in micro-
electronic systems, thereby bi-passing intermediate technologies.
The idea later crystallised, that by absorbing the most advanced
digital technology Brazil could effectively prevent any
“technology gap" from developing between itself and the advanced
economies due to the diffusion of information technologies.
In effect CPqD was to be Brazil's leading edge in absorbing
digital technology and “catching up" in the field of micro-
electronic technology.
At the start however, CPqD's main aim was to dominate
all three areas of digital Telecomms technology - exchange,
transmission, and peripheral systems. By mastering the
technology in these areas Brazil could locally supply the
knowhow and personnel needed for digitalising the whole of
the domestic Telecomms network,
Beside these strategic plans for dominating micro-
electronic technology, CPqD would also function in response
to day to day requests from the State operating companies.
Currently, requests for special product development are
chanelled to CPqD for development or contracting out, providing
the technology is approved. In this way CPqD is geared to





After a product is developed and reaches the industrial
prototype stage the technology. is transferred to industry for
production. Normally the choice of firms is decided before
the manufacturing stage as it is necessary for the chosen
company to be actively engaged in the R&D especially in the
later stages of development. Patents belonging to TELEBRAS are
then registered and royalties are received, normally from the
Gperetcng! Companies,
In short CPqD is not simply an R&D centre but actually
represents a system forthe Nat;
All the various research groups,
  
a accumulation of technology.
 
firms, institutions and
personnel involved are organised to respond to: a) the strategic
Government objectives towards Telecomms and microelectronic _ -
technology, and b) the specific technological demands of
the State operating companies. Through its authority under
TELEBRAS, CPqD is also able to choose which firms are to
develop and manufacture particular products. In addition
CPgD's coordinating and financial role enables control to be
exercised over the basic research activities throughout the
country, mainly in the universities. Thus, from the outset
CPqD was designed to be a system of technological aquisition
and coordination to meet Brazil's overall digital Telecomms
objectives and the specific regional needs of all the various
operating companies.
3.3.2 Digital Technological Developments under CPqD:
While a case study of CPqD's achievements is outside
the scope of this paper it is possible here to outline the
main programmes underway, and to present progress to date in
the technological "heart" of Telecommunications - exchange
systems. Table 7 presents all the major projects currently
under development together with the institutions and firms
involved. As can be seen the major areas of digital exchange,
transmission and peripheral technology are covered, involving
a large numer of research institutions and firms.
 
 
1) Part 4.4 below describes some of the successes in producing and adapting
microelectronic technology to meet local needs.
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Programme of Digital Transmission
-MCP 120/480 (PCM 120/480
channels)
-Radi-834 (Digital Radio)
Programme of Data Communications
- REXPAX (Experimental packet
switching network)
Programme of Optical Communications
- ELO-34(Optic fibre system)










CPqD, UNICAMP, CETUC (Centre
of Telecomms Studies, Catholic
University - Rio) and LME
(Laboratory of Microelectronics
University of Sao Paulo)
CPqD, EDB (Division of EMBRATEL)
and FDTE.
CPqD and UNICAMP.
CPqD and: LPD(R&D Lab.of UNICAMP)
CPqD, LPD and xX-Tal.*
Satellite Communications Programme
- ETP (Public Telephone Station)
- ERTV (TV receiving station)
- LCS (Laboratory of Satellite
Communications)
- Other Projects including:
Satellite Interference, and
signal processing and transmission,
Telecomms Systems Programme
- Interference between terrestial
systems
- Radio-electric systems






CPqD, EBT and CETUC
CPqD, EBT and CETUC.
CPqD, TELEBRAS Oprations
Directorate, and CETUC.
Components and Materials Programme
- Laser and semiconductor
- Fibre optics
- Hybrid Circuits, thick and
thin film
- Integrated circuits
- Electronic grade materials
CPqD and LPD.
CPqD and X-Tal*
CPqD, CETUC, LME, Laboratory
of Electronic Devices (Universi
ty of Sao Paulo-LED) ,Elebra*
and Gradiente*
CPqD, LED, and LME.
CPqD and UNICAMP.
Compiled from various sources including CPqD, TELEBRAS, Assis (1978
pp20-21, Company Reports and Interviews.
* indicates private company.
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Brazil is the only country in the Third World to have
successfully developed and installed an integrated optical fibre
system using multiplexor and laser technology (the ECO-I).
The ECO-I was developed from several of the projects listed above,
and all the necessary technology including industrial grade silicon
material for manufacturing optical fibres, is being transferred
to local industry for production this year. CPqD's satellite
programme is also well advanced and has succeeded in producing
low-cost digital receiving stations, together with all the
necessary components and equipment for the Brazilian communications
satellite to be launched next year. Various integrated circuits
are already under production by CPqD, and a pilot line with
a capacity of 100,000 hybrid circuits per year, for use in
central public exchanges is now being developed in conjunction
with 2 local Brazilian firms.
By far the largest programme under CPqD isthe Tropico
exchange technology project which absorbs around 30% to 40% of
total CPqD investments.” Tropico is a family of digital
stored program controlled exchanges based on the most advanced
time division switching technology. The main objective of
Tropico is to design and develop totally in Brazil, digital
exchanges not only of the highest quality but also more suited
to the particular climatic and telephone traffic conditions
found in Brazil. From 1985 50% of Brazil's internal market is
to be supplied by CPqD's technology. Over the longer-term it
is intended that Brazilian exchange technology should be able to
compete with products available on the international market.
The R&D philosophy adopted by CPqD was to begin by
developing low capacity exchanges and gradually build up to
medium and large scale systems. Even a brief analysis demons-
trates the considerable success to date in developing and
manufacturing these systems.
The initial project Tropico C (originally called SISCOM 3
entailed the development of a line concentrator with a capacity
of 100 and 200 terminals. Essentially a line concentrator is
equipment linked to a central exchange which allows a given
 
3 er of subscribers to be “concentrated" through far fewer
1) Telebrasil (1982) Nov/Dec p78.  
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lines than otherwise necessary. Line concentrators are especially
imporant given Brazil's need for low-cost expansion of existing
exchange capacity. To date CPqD has completed the design and
development of Tropico C using PCM multiplexing techniques to
transmit the signals, together with a digital-analogue converter
at subscriber level. Field tests began in 1932 in Rio de Janeiro
and the system is ready to be industrialised and used in the
TELEBRAS network.
Using much of the same design knowhow, the next project
Tropico R involved the development of a small, low-capacity
public exchange with a capacity of 1000 terminals. Again a
TDS system wholly produced in Brazil, Tropico R was’ especially
designed for low-density urban and rural use. This project too
has successfully reached the field test stage and is now ready
for production.? It is interesting to note that the 3 private
companies involved in the later development stages (see Table 7)
are all new wholly Brazilian firms. This not only illustrates
CPqD's role in developing local technological resources but also
in transfering the know-how to local industry.
Building on the experience of Tropico R, the next project
Tropico L was a medium scale local and tandem public exchange
with a capacity of 60,000 lines. Although some of the
hardware from Tropico R was used in the development of this
exchange, far more sophisticated upgrading of the system design
was necessary. Again Tropico L is a fully digital TDS exchange
developed completely in Brazil. CPqD began first prototype tests
in May 1981 and field tests at the end of 1983; the system is
planned for manufacture and installation this year. In January
83 MINICOM authorised a consortium headed by the largest
Brazilian firm Elebra to begin negotiations over the development
and manufacture of this system with CPqD and TELEBRAS. As noted
earlier, the willingness of a major MNC, Equitel/Siemens, to
participate in this consortium indicates the tendency towards the
increasing technological integration of the Myc's.?
1) In July '82 Elebra was authorised by MINICOM to begin manufacture, Docas
Annual Report (1982) pII.
2) The final project, Tropico T, is discussed at the end of this section.
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3.3.3 Further Research Recommendations:
A) Technological "Learning" at CPqD
Since 1976 CPqD has accumulated sufficient experience
and technology to master the frontier areas of digital Telecomms
technology. A detailed analysis of the technological "learning"?
experience at the level of CPqD, to illustrate the channels and
mechanisms by which this technology was acquired could be of
considerable interest to other DC's wishing to acquire a national
base in digital Telecomms technology. An examination of CPqD's
successful role as a system of national technological accumulation,
both at the coordinating managerial level, and at the micro/
engineering level, could also add to our very limited knowledge
of how information-based microelectronic technology can be
acquired. (As opposed to mechanical and electromechanical technology
for which there now exists substantial evidence). Furthermore,
a detailed. investigation of this type could also have a wider
bearing on the potential impact of microelectronic diffusion on
the Third World - if indeed other DC's are also in a position
to effectively "leap-frog" intermediate technologies and prevent
a further widening of the technology gap between Developed and
Developing Countries.
B) Should Brazil Develop Large Scale TDS exchanges?
Of more immediate interest to Brazil is the question of
whether the country should begin the development of large scale
public exchange systems. Tropico T, the final project in CPqD's
exchange series is a proposal for a large-scale central exchange.
Until now this project has not been clearly defined, but there
are strong reasons to doubt whether the production of Tropico T
is the best strategy for Brazil to follow. To compete in
design and quality with existing international systems would
require a huge increase in financial and technological resources
to establish the critical mass necessary to successfully
develop this type of system.
1) For exact definition and benefits of "learning" see Bell and Hoffman
(1981).
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Internationally the central exczange market is both
oversubscribed and fiercely competitive with soaring R&D costs.
There are currently 16 major Telecomms exchange systems
developed at a cost of over $6b competing for uncommitted export
markets of only $2b to $3b per annum. Market analysis shows that
it is highly probable that many of these systems will not realise
any profit at ai. .
To win export orders it is now becoming almost obligatory
for the MNC suppliers, or their domestic Governments, to offer
extremely cheap credit. For example,to win the recent Indian
order the French Government had to step in to support CIT-Alcatel
to guarantee a cheap loan “aid for trade" arrangement, while
ITT are currently offering China 25 years credit at only 1% p.a.
to compete with the French. *
Rapidly rising R&D costs also make entry into the large
scale TDS exchange markets prohibitive. ITT for example have
spent between $300m and $500m developing their 1240 system.?
After investing over $100m in development the Swiss appear to
have pulled out of the competition. The British System X, now
finally developed over many years at a huge investment cost,
appears unlikely to win any major export markets after loosing
the recent Indian contract to the better established French
CIT-Alcatel system. If we compare the magnitudes of exchange
development costs, averaging roughly $375m for each system,
with Brazil's total investments in Telecomms R&D of around
$20m to $30m per year it is obvious that an immediate and massive
increase in investment would be a necessary prerequisite for
market entry.
In short, the extremely high risk and cost of entering
the international export market in exchange systems means that
all alternative avenues to developing large scale TDS technology
in Brazil should be explored. Research is therefore requied
into alternative means of gaining technological capabilities to
meet Brazil's needs. Given the unlikelyhood of Brazil successfully
1) Muller (1982) pl06. See also QECD (1983).
2) Details Electronics Weekly (1983) May 4 pll, and Electronic Times (1983)
May 20 pl and plo.
3) OECD (1983) p.54.
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competing in head on competition with the MNC's for export
markets, research is also required into whether Brazil's domestic
market could support such a huge investment programme, especially
in view of Brazil's current internal and external financial
debt.
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PART 4 EFFECTS OF THE ECONOMIC crisis?, POLICY PROBLEMS
AND PROPOSALS
Progress in Brazilian Telecomms has w.thout doubt been
impressive, however it would be wrong to suggest that the sector
does not face serious difficulties. The purzose of this section
is to examine the major infrastructural and industrial problems
caused both by the current economic crisis and policy failures,
and thereby arrive at policy recommendations. Section 4.1
briefly outlines the extent and impact of Government imposed
investment restrictions as a result of the crisis. Section 4.2
examines the severe problems encountered in the rural sector
due to the economic recession and the overall low priority
accorded to regional and rural Telecomms. Section 4.3 describes
the important technological role of the growing small-scale
sector and the serious threat to continued technological accumul-
lation posed by the crisis. Finally section 4.4 assesses Brazil's
success to date in adapting digital technology to suit local
conditions and argues that Brazil could become an important
alternative source of microelectronic products and technology
for other Developing Countries (in areas other than central
exchange technology).
 
4.1 Investment Restrictions and the Fall in Potential Telecomms
Growth -
“As a result of mounting Government debt and balance of
payments problems following the economic "miracle" period the
original Second Plan expansion of Telecomms was cut back substant-
ially,? and considerable financial resources were diverted from
Telecomms to other sectors of the economy. In 1975 SEPLAN, the
overall Government planning authority began placing investment
restrictions on the Telecomms sector; as a consequence the level of
investments fell from a peak of around $1.8b in 1976 to $1.3b
in 1979, stabilising at just under $lb from 1980 onwards.>
1) In Brazil the term "crisis" refers generally to the recessionary period
following the oil and commodity price increases of 1973 and 1974, charac-
terised by balance of payments problems, accelerating inflation, rising
unemployment and extremely low rates of econanic growth in relation to the
previous boom period of 1967 to 1973. For analysis and causation see Wells
(1979) and Balassa (1979) ."Crisis" and "Recession" are used interchangeably.
2) See Earp (1982) ppl06 to 108
3) See Table 2 above.
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In terms of the equipment supply sector the imposed
cuts reduced the size of the market considerably, from appx.
$1.2b in 1975 to a level of around $800m since 1978:
Table 8: Brazil's Telecomms Equipment Supply Market 1975-83.










Sources: Wajnberg (1982) and (1983).
The market reductions illustrated in value terms in Table 8
represent a very substantial fall in the actual number of physical
lines contracted out by TELEBRAS for manufacture. In terms of
lines the market shrank from around lm in 1973 to 1974 to the
low level of under 400,000 up to 1982. In 1983 latest estimates
show a modest increase in market size to about 500,000 lines
due to the slight increase in investment in 1982 over the 1980
and 1981 levels.+
These heavy reductions in demand for equipment following
the rapid expansion of MNC investment over the period 1967 to
1973, resulted in a severe and continuing problem of overcapacity
since 1975. Production output over the second half of the 1970s
averaged only 55% of installed capacity, (reaching 65% for cable
manufactures) *, The increased output last year meant a relatively
good performance with capacity utilisation overall of appx. 70%.
As a direct result of overcapacity and investment
restrictions total employment in the supply sector fell by
roughly one hale.? Plessey and Philips withdrew from the market,
 
1) Sources: Revista Telebras (Various Issues) and Wajnberg (1983).
2) Wajnberg (L982) pé.
3) It should be noted that the equipment supply sector represents only a
small proportion of total Telecomms employment in Brazil as elsewhere.
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while Ericsson and the other MNC's were forced into redundancies
and factory closures.
Alongside the enforced investment cutbacks by SEPLAN
two further means have been used to restrict the potential rate
of growth of Telecomms, and divert resources to other sectors.
The first relates to the tariff levels imposed by Government.
While Telecomms tariffs remained well below the rate of inflation
over the period 1973 to 1983, input prices to the sector
experienced no such restrictions. Over the 1972 to 1980 period
tariffs increased 12 times over, while Telecomms input prices
grew 21.6 times. Since 1980 this "squeeze" has intensified
with the average rate of tariff increase less than one third of
the rate of inflation.+
The second method used to divert resources is the direct
appropriation of finance from the Brazilian Telecomms Fund (FNT).
Appx. 30% of the price of each telephone call is chanelled to
the FNTset up originally in 1973 as a source of central
investment funding for Telecomms. The aim of centralising these
resources under MINICOM was to enable the rapid expansion of
services into the less profitable regions, effectively cross-
subsidised by the more profitable States. In terms of overall
importance to Telecomms investment the FNT (in spite of heavy
resource appropriations) provided an average of around 24% p.a,
of TELEBRAS's total investments over the 1973 to 1981 period.*
Since 1975 a large percentage of FNT resources has been
diverted to the National Development Fund to finance other
Government activities. Between 1975 and 1980 tctal resources
appropriated reached the huge accumulated figure of Cr43b
(appx. $813m) .? By 1980 the percentage of resources chanelled
away from the FNT reached 50%. Since 1980 this position has
worsened still. In 1983 of Cr225b FNT receipts only Cr75b (or 33%)
were returned for Telecomms investments. In 1984 only 10% of
fund receipts are planned to be reinvested in Telecomms (Cr52b
 
1) Telebrasil (1983) Nov/Dec. p7. and Revista Telebras (1981) Sept. p72.
2) Calculated from Telebrasil (1981) Sept. p76.
3) Telebrasil (1983) Nov/Dec. p3.
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from a total of cr520b) .7
The long-term wisdom of these considerable restrictions
in potential investment and expansion of the Telecomms network
is not an issue that can be dealt with in a sectoral case study
but a matter for overall resource allocation and development
planning. Indeed, it may be that other more urgent social and
economic needs justify this resource diversion. It should
also be remembered that despite the cutbacks Telecomms services
have continued to grow extremely rapidly and profitably - an
additional indicator of the sector's overall performance.
Within the Telecomms sector however it is possible to analyse
the effects of the recession and imposed investment restrictions
- the most badly effected area being rural Telecommunications.
4.2 Rural and Regional” Telecomms - the Problem of Low Priority
In terms of infrastructural expansion the cubtacks
impose by SEPLAN after 1975 seriously reduced the intended
rate of rural and regional.Telecomms expansion. The decision
to divert resources from Telecomms to other Government activities
led to a restructuring of Telecomms investment priorities
based on profitability. This meant that areas of social
investment and low return on capital, notably regional and rural
Telecomms, fell to the lowest level of priority after internation-
al, inter-state, inter-urban and urban investment. As a result
the rate of growth of rural Telecomms proceeded at an extremely
low level in relation to the major cities and urban areas.
According to the census of 1980 the total number of
terminals in the rural sector amounted to only 75,000. Today this
figure stands at little more than 90,000, or put another way,
only 1% of rural households in Brazil possess a telephone.
 
1) Telebrasil (1983) Nov/Dec. p3.
2) In Brazil it is necessary to analyse Telecams in Regional as well as Rural
terms due to the geographical and econamic diversity of the various States
of the country.
3) Source, Minister of Agriculture, Telebrasil (1983) July/Aug. Although these
figures refer to the strictest definition of "rural", this is still an
extremely low figure, especially when one considers that 7.8% of the population
overall possess a telephone.
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This extremely poor level of telephone coverage reflects on
one hand the investment restrictions imposed by SEPLAN due to
the economic crisis, and on the other the much deeper poverty
of many of the rural areas in relation to the main industrial
centres. Overall this must be considered a very grave long-term
problem given the vital need for social overhead investments
in the poorer areas, and given the threat to the continuing
efficiency of agriculture posed by a weak and sparse Telecomms
coverage.
In terms of regional Telecomms, in spite of the absence
of any systematic and detailed research, it is possible to
illustrate the effects of the cutbacks using information from
the various regional operating companies.? On the whole this data
shows that throughout the poorer regions of Brazil the crisis
and investment cuts have resulted in frozen investment projects,
low Telecomms growth and unsatisfied demand.
Evidence from Telepar, responsible for providing services
to Parana in the South of Brazil, shows that as a consequence
of investment restrictions the growth of telephone coverage
is insufficient to mect local demand. At the same time, plant
utilisation has not reached its target level of 90%. More
fortunate in the Southern region, Telesc for Santa Catarina
report continued progress regardless of the crisis with the
approval of a Crlb investment budget for 1983.
In the generally poorer regions of the North East severe
problems, intensified by the recession, are reported by most
of the operating companies. In Pernambuco several major rural
projects have been frozen since the mid '70s due to investment
restrictions; as a consequence telephone coverage still only
amounts to 2.6 per 100 people, while the inadequate transmission
coverage often results in inter-urban conjestion. A similar
situation exists in Rio Grande do Norte where investment cuts
have prevented the full communications integration of the State.
Also in the North East Telebahia of Bahia report a continued
inability to meet current demand for Telecomms services due to
 
1) Sources: Interviews with MINICOM and various issues of Telebrasil and
Revista Telebras,
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lack of investment resources.
Serious problems are also evident in the Northern
region of the Amazon, where Teleamazon are unable to provide
further infrastructural expansion to many of the interior
regions due to investment cuts. Despite the progress made in
extending satellite communications to many parts of the Amazon
the coverage of the interior is still very poor. Restrictions
on operating expenditures also mean that the maintenance of the
system (often needing boats and planes) has become a very severe
problem for the operating company.
In the Central Eastern regional of Goias, Telegoids reports
increasing debt, again especially due to the maintenance of
existing services. In addition the company is unable to expand
infrastructure to meet the currently unsatisfied demand in the
region, due to the low priority accorded to regional projects.
Other operating companies report similar problems to
lesser or greater extents. Overall it is clear that as a direct
result of the crisis and subsequent investment restrictions,
rural and regional Telecomms have not progressed to anywhere
near the same level of coverage and quality as the major
industrial centres or the capital Bras{lia. Research by the
Banco Nacional Crédito Cooperativo shows that from a sample
of 100 of Brazil's rural cooperatives their exists an unattended
demand of 26,000 terminals. This study suggests that in each
of Brazil's 2140 rural production and electrification coops
there is similar unsatisfied demand. In spite of this large
demand the service companies are forced to restrain their
regional programmes due to Government imposed investment cuts.
In short, by concentrating investment in the relatively high
profit areas, regional and rural Telecomms have been forced to
bear the brunt of the post '74 Brazilian economic crisis within
the Telecomms sector.
4.2.1 Policy Proposals
Currently the Ministry of Agriculture together with
MINICOM are attempting to resolve the problem of lack of invest-
ment by raising finance via the existing agricultural cooperatives.
However, given the extent of the problem this can only be a
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partial solution. It should be recognised that in relation to
the industrial areas rural and regional Telecomms are severely
underdeveloped. For both socioeconomic reasons and for reasons
of continuing agricultural productivity it is therefore vital
that a) far greater priority is given to rural Telecomms within
the Telecomms sector, and b) if possible the National Telecomms
Fund should be used to support the expansion of infrastructure
into the poorest regions as originally plannea.?
4.3 Recession and the Threat to Brazilian Small-Scale Industry
andTechnology z
The general effects of the crisis in terms of unemployment,
overcapacity and investment restrictions were outlined in Section
4.1. However, within the industrial sector the economic
position of the MNC subsidiaries is far stronger than that of
local Brazilian firms for the following reasons. First, the
far greater operating scale of the MNC's allows not only
significant cost advantages in production, but also greater
access to lower cost financial resources; consequently, the
MNC's are in a better position to withstand both short and
longer term liquidity problems, order cutbacks and the general
financial constraints intensified by the recession. Second, the
size of the MNC's and their access to foreign technology
allows easier diversification into other product areas. For
example, since 1975 ITT/SESA have moved into the production
of photographic and computer equipment. Ericsson is now
manufacturing components for IBM computers and also photographic
equipment for Kodak. NEC has diversified into microwave trans-
mission equipment and is also producing parts for mainframe
computers,
A third major advantage of the MNC's is that the type
of equipment they produce, mainly large-scale exchange equipment,
is not subject to the same degree of demand fluctuation and
uncertainty as the relatively, lower-level technology produced
by the small-scale Brazilian firms.? The longer cycle time
 
1) This would also permit the wider use of the many new digital product innova-




of exchange equipment allows greater time and flexibility
for planning and organising production output. The fourth
advantage of MNC's over local firms relates to longer-term
investment cutbacks forced upon firms by the recession. If
cuts are imposed upon technological investments by the local
MNC's, access to parent company technology is always available.
This is not the case for technological investments by national
firms who depend on their ability to produce technology
locally. .
This final point is extremely important in terms of
the continuing role of Brazilian industry in upgrading and adding
to the overall technological capacity of the country. As one
ef the directors of a local Brazilian company put it, in order
for local firms to remain in the market, it is necessary to
develop technology locally as part of their very survival
strategy. Without a continuous upgrading of the technological
capacity of these firms they cannot hope to compete in the
nighly sohpisticated and rapidly changing microelectronic
Telecomms market. In other words dynamic local technological
accumulation is a necessary condition for the survival of the
new Brazilian firms - this is not the case for the MNC's, who
as discussed earlier, develop technology as a strategic means
of market competition and not as a condition for survival.
Turning to the actual participation and role of local
Brazilian capital in the market, Table 9 lists the 21 largest
Telecorms enterprises as of 1981 by sales. The 7 largest firms
are all of foreign origin occupying just over 83% of the
market. In the public exchange equipment market the MNC
concentration is even more pronounced with around 98% of sales.
However, since 1974 when there were virtually no local firms in
the market, there has been a consistent and rapid growth
of small and now medium scale Telecomms companies. By 1976
following the introduction of import restrictions, local firms
occupied around 2% of the market. By 1980 this figure had
increased to 10%, and at the end of 1981 local Brazilian firms
supplied 16.7% of total Telecomms equipment.”
 
1) Wajnberg (1982) pll.
2) ibid and Maculan (1981) pl59.
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Table 9: Major Firms in the Brazilian Telecomms Equipment
Supply Industry (1981 Sales,in Millions of Cruzeiros).
Firm Name Sales (total equipment
Ericsson do Brasil* 17,961
NEC do Brasil* 8,877
Standard Electric (SESA)* 8,871
GTE do Brasil* 5,644
Telettra* sg 3,306
















Source: Wajnberg (1982) pll.
*signifies firms of foreign capital origin.
Today there are appx.120 local firms supplying inputs
for the TELEBRAS system, representing about 14% of total fixed
capital investment of the Telecomms industry.? These firms
currently represent around 10% to 15% of annual Telecomms
investment in the supply industry. In terms of employment the
participation of Brazilian capital is becoming extremely
important. In 1982 with roughly 14% of capital investment the
new medium and small scale firms absorbed around 30% of the
labour force. Overall it is estimated that these firms have
the capacity to generate 3 times the employment per unit of
investment than the major MNC's.
Alongside the proliferation of local firms there has
been a consistent upgrading of the technological capacity of
this segment of the industrial sector. In 1975 local firms
were mainly engaged in producing relatively simple equipment
and technology for HF and VHF radio equipment used in transmission.
By 1980 local capital had progressed through to more sophisticated
1) The following information is from Telebrasil (1983) Jan/Feb. p54, and
Telebrasil (1983) Sept/Oct.pp4-5.
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areas of transmission equipment together with terminals for
telephones and telegraph.
Today local Brazilian firms play a very important role
as an alternative source of products and technology for
TELEBRAS. Some of the larger Brazilian firms are actively
engaged in technological investments and have built up their
own R&D departments. For example the largest company Elebra
invested Cr350m (around $2m) in R&D in 1982, and now employs
140 full time electronics engineers. Other larger firms are
also presently involved in joint technological developments
with CPqD for the TELEBRAS system.
The following products developed jointly with CPqD
illustrate the dynamic technological progress of local Brazilian
capital since 1974. First, Tropico C, a line concentrator,
is now developed and currently in production. Second, Tropico R
the TDS exchange system is also developed and ready for manufact-
ure,.In transmission technology, the MCP-30, a digital multiplexor
is already in production by local firms, together with the
MDT-101, a telegraph and data communications multiplexor. Also
in transmission a terminal device for digital laser communication,
the ELO-34 has been manufactured, and optical fibres for use
in laser transmission are due to be manufactured this year
using silicon material also developed locally. In addition
many other products in the Satellite programme, together with
various materials, components and peripheral devices are currently
under production. Currently between 10% and 15% of the 7
TELEBRAS budget is destined for orders for small and medium
scale Brazilian firms.
Although local firms have experienced a successful
period of growth over the last 10 years or so, the prolonged
effects of the economic crisis and Governments cuts are especially
severe on local firms given their inherent economic and technolog-
ical disadvantages in relation to the MNC's. Unlike the MNC's
Brazilian firms have very little definition of medium and long-
term contracts to help plan production. Orders from TELEBRAS
are subject to far greater amendment and uncertainty. The
financial weakness of local firms in relation to the MNC's is
also aggravated as a result of the recession. With small firms
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investment cutbacks actually threaten continuity in local
technological progress (whereas the MNC's usually have access
to technology from the parent companies). Much shorter lead
times can prevent adequate production, financial and technological
planning, while order cutbacks and the inability to diversify
production can mean severe financial problems and bankruptcy.
4.3.1. Implications and Policy Proposals:
Since 1974 a large number of small and now medium scale
Brazilian firms have developed and grown to play an important
role in local technological progress in digital Telecomms. The
entry of many small scale firms into what was a rigidly
MNC dominated, oligopolistic market up to 1974 was the result
of: a) import restrictions imposed upon the MNC's and the
operating companies, hb) deliberate Government policy support
for local capital, and c) the "modular" nature of digital
technology itself which permitted the entry of small scale
suppliers and the gradual upgrading of technological capabilities.?
The possibility of market entry and local technological progress
in this manner is extremely important, and encouraging, to other
DC's wishing to manufacture and develop digital technolocy.
In terms of Brazilian Government policy, it is important
that more recognition is given to local industry, both as a
dynamic source of national technological accumulation, and
as a present and future alternative source of Telecomms equipment.
As discussed above, technological aquisition through the MNC's
is a constant and difficult bargaining process - the existence
of an alternative Brazilian production base in microelectronic
technology substantially strenghtens TELEBRAS's overall position
in relation to the major equipment suppliers.
More specifically it is recommended that a policy
distinction is made between the MNC subsidiaries and the new
firms of wholly Brazilian origin. At present no such distinction
 
1) ‘the industry point of view is given by Telebrasil (1983) Nov/Dec.
2) In economic terms this indicates a greater degree of capital divisibility in
digital technology over electromechanical technology (see Part 2 above).
is made; current policy is to consider any firm of majority
voting shares in the hands of Brazilian capital, as equal for
the purposes of policy. This means that the MNC's (now all
majority owned by Brazilian capital) have a built-in competitive
advantage over local firms.Given the important technological
role of firms of local capital origin, policy discrimination
is needed in favour of local companies to help them toward a
more equal competitive position with the MNC's.
Specific measures could potentially be introduced to:
a) guarantee at least equal order continuity for local firms,
b) financially support the smaller firms especially in the area
of technological investments, c) increase the quota of orders
allocated to Brazilian firms, and d) expand the existing
technological cooperation between CPqD and local capital.
A clarification and reaffirmation of policy support for local
Brazilian firms would be of great benefit to Brazil's overall
progress in digital Telecommunications.
4.4 Brazil as Exporter of Telecomms Products and Technologies.
A final issue of policy importance, especially in the
context of the current Government and IMF pressures to increase
exports as a solution to the crisis, is the potential role of
Brazil as an exporter of Telecomms products and technologies.
Section 3.3.3 above explained why competing in the major
exchange markets internationally cannot be considered a viable
proposition, at least in the short and medium term. Together
with the financial and technological reasons already discussed
there is an important scale consideration which puts Brazil at
a severe disadvantage in relation to the major MNC Telecomms
equipment suppliers. Internationally 5 of the majors produce
over 1 million lines p.a. while most of the others produce
800,000 or more each year. This gives the individual MNC's
a huge economy of scale advantage over Brazil where currently
the annual output of around 400,000 is shared between four
major companies. The prospects for Brazil to enter the main
international exchange markets must therefore be considered very
poor.
 
1) Telebrasil (1983) Sept/Oct.
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However, there is good reason to believe that Brazil
could become, in the very short term, a major Third World
supplier of other areas of Telecomms technology as a result of the
experience to date in planning, acquiring and adapting digital
technology to suit local conditions. Two of the main problems
facing DC's in the expansion and improvement of their Telecomms
networks are: 1) the need to rely on the MNC's who supply
the products for advice and expertise, and 2) the product
technologies themselves, which are normally designed to suit
the climatic, economic and telephone traffic conditions of
the advanced economies not the DC's. Brazil's successful
experience in planning, legislating and financing a modern
Telecomms network, as well as bargaining with the MNC's to begin
local technological developments, could be of considerable
assistance to other DC's with similar, or even less ambitious
objectives, Potentially there is scope for Brazil to supply
consultancy expertise in all these vital areas of Telecomms
planning and implementation - and therefore provide for other
DC's an alternative to reliance upon the MNC's and other
agencies from the advanced countries who lack this direct
experience,
In addition Brazil has to date developed a considerable
range of product innovations based on the greater flexibility
of digital over electromechanical technology. Brazil's experience
in adapting microelectronic technology to suit local economic,
climatic and telephone traffic conditions could well be a
source of technology-based competitive advantage over the major
international suppliers. While an appropriate export stragegy
would require detailed analysis and investigation, it is possible
here to briefly present some of Brazil's achievements in
producing microelectronic technologies more suited to DC conditions.
Beginning with exchange technology, Telebahia, the
operating company for Bahia, has developed and is currently
using low-cost, simplified automatic exchanges (known as CTAS's),
designed especially for small towns and rural areas. The CTAS
costs only 1/10 of a central exchange system, with only 1/5
of the installation costs. As a low cost means of expanding
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network capacity, this is ideally suited not only to Bahia
where around 80% of the population live outside the major
cities, but also other regions within Brazil and indeed to
other DC's looking for a low-cost solution to Telecomms expansion.
To help increase access to public telephones, Brazil
has developed a number of systems centred around the concept
of Community Telephone Services - all made possible by the
flexibility of digital technology. For example, Telpe of Pernam-
buco responding to the heavy concentration of reverse charge
calls, has installed a system developed by Telesc (of Santa
Catarina) which allows automatic collect! calls via public
telephones. A similar system developed for use in the Amazon
region allows public telephone calls without coins. Other
variations on community telephone services include public
telephones especially designated for receiving calls and making
collect calls. Inter-urban automatic reverse charge systems
are also currently in operation; by using a special dialing
coce a recorded voice asks the telephone subscriber whether
he or she is willing to accept a reverse charge call, and at the
same time gives information as to the caller and city. These
types of systems are particularly important in DC's where
public telephones are relied upon far more than in the developed
countries.
In order to maximise the use of public telephone lines
MINICOM has recently approved various "line-sharing" systems
using Brazilian PCM technology. These allow more than one
person to use the same telephone line, with separate telephone
extensions. A light indicates when the line is being utilised
and one user cannot hear the other; separate numbers and accounts
are also maintained. A variation on the line-sharing idea is
already in use by Teleceara in the North East which allows
I line to be shared by 10 separate callers. Again, these types
of systems could prove very relevant to other DC's looking for
sensible and inexpensive methods of expanding urban and rural
Telecommunications.
1) In England "reverse charge" calls.
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A number of new digital transmission systems have also
been designed and introduced in Brazil to help overcome the
very high cost per line of installing rural Telecomms. Embracom,
one of the new Brazilian firms has developed a digital system
(currently awaiting approval by TELEBRAS), which utilises
existing electrical cables to transmit telephone signals. This
system uses FDM techniques ‘and enables up to 8 telephones to
operate simultaneously with one pair of existing electrical
cables. Using existing infrastructure in this manner is extremely
important for remote regions and expanding rural Telecomms to
improve agricultural efficiency.
Also in transmission, CPqD has developed a low-cost
satellite communications system for low and medium capacity
telephone traffic. This was designed especially for extending
transmission to small towns and rural areas. All the necessary
digital equipment including amplifiers, transmitters and
receivers was developed in Brazil, and EMBRATEL has already
contracted out 220 units for manufacture.
To cope with the more inaccessible and remote regions
of low density where it is not feasible to use satellite communi-
cations, portable digital radio telephones have been designed.
These were developed especially for use in areas divided by
islands and rivers. Teletet of Sao Paulo has developed and
is currently manufacturing digital telephones for use by
Teleamazon in the Amazon region. This particular system is
not designed to receive calls but only to make outgoing calls
which are reverse-charged automatically. This is an extremely
low cost method of providing urgent Telecomms services up to a
distance of 70kms with both urban and inter-urban dialing.
At present the World Bank is funding an experimental
project of installing 17 digital radio telephones to serve 15
small rural villages, thereby avoiding the high expense of
laying transmission infrastructure. If the project is successful
TELEBRAS intends to extend this method of communication to
the whole of the Amazon region.
1) The cost is around Cr200,000 for each telephone (appx.$1100 - 1982 prices).
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4.4,1 Implications and policy Proposals
Since 1975 Brazil has succeeded in producing an abundance
of digital technological innovations to meet the needs of the
local Telecomms network. The range of innovations already
developed demonstrate the comparative flexibility of microelec-
tronic over previous technologies. Digital technology has made
feasible low cost satellite communications, small inexpensive
exchange systems, simple methods of line sharing and several
methods of low-cost transmission suitable for pe's.t
For other DC's, Brazil's successful exploitation of
digital technology should prove both instructive and useful.
Clearly there is potential for other DC's to adapt digital
Telecomms technology to suit local needs.
Regarding Brazil's role as a potential exporter of
technology, it is recommended that further research is conducted
into: a) further areas of digital technological innovations,
b) potential technology export markets in other DC's, and
c) an appropriate strategy for Brazil's entry into technology
exports in Telecomms.
Brazil's potential role as an alternative source to
the major MNC suppliers, could take the form of intra Third
World technology cooperation or technology sharing.” Awareness
raising could be conducted at inter-Governmental level, particularly
in international Telecomms forums such as the ITU (the Inter-
national Telecommunications Union). Methods of organising
trade could possibly take the form of soft currency trade, or
exchange for other imports vital for Brazil such as oil and other
raw materials;-bilateral trade of this nature would avoid the
need for raising hard currency and generally assist in balance
of payments difficulties.
While proposals of this kind are by definition speculative,
Brazil's substantial experience in both planning and acquiring
digital technology strongly suggest the possibility of a technology
based competitive advantage over existing Developed Country
 
1) It should also be noted that the whole of CPqD's research is geared towards
meeting the specific needs of Brazil.
2) The recent speech by the Minister of Communications officially confims
Brazil's desire to engage in such cooperation (Mattos 1983),
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Suppliers. However, a detailed planning and research programme
would be a prerequisite for success in this area.
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CONCLUSION: RELEVANCE TO OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Since 1974 the Brazilian Telecomms industry has progressed
from a situation of deep technological dependency to one of
substantial and dynamic progress in modern digital Telecomms.
At the same time the domestic Telecomms infrastructure has been
modernised and expanded and is now in a good position to meet
the forthcoming demands of information technology. Brazil's
remarkable industrial, technological and infrastructural achieve-
ments were primarily the result of forceful and forward-looking
Government policy intervention in a sector formerly owned and
controlled by foreign enterprise.
While it must be remembered that Brazil is in many
respects a special case among DC's, given it's size and technolo-
gical and industrial infrastructure, there are many points of
dizect relevance and interest to other DC's. Indeed, the
Brazilian example illuminates several issues regarding: a) the
accumulation of microelectronic technology, b) the benefits of
developing a strong local Telecomms industry, and c) the role
of Government policy. These issues are important not only for
other large industrialising counties, but also for smaller DC's
wishing to expand their basic Telecomms infrastructure. It is
helpful to consider these three points in turn.
Virtually from scratch, with little experience in mocro-
electronic technology and even less local industry, Brazil
acquired a strong base in Telecomms technology in an extremely
short period of time. In fact it was precisely the diffusion of
digital technology during the '70s which provided the opportunity
for Brazil to enter what was previously a closed and rigidly
defined market. On the one hand Brazil was able to exploit the
intense MNC competition for Third World Markets, by insisting
that manufacturing and technological activities were located
within the national boundaries. On the other hand, the
characteristics of digital technology itself, in terms of skill
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requirements, modularity and flexibility, allowed Government
enterprise to rapidly accumulate substantial experience and
knowhow in Telecomms - beginning with relatively simple digital
technologies and gradually moving up the scale of complexity
to medium scale public exchanges, satellite systems, and
high capacity optical fibre transmission. At the same time
it was the arrival of digital technology which permitted the
rapid growth and participation of small scale local enterprise,
now supplying almost 20% of the domestic market.
The potential for local technological development
demonstrated by Brazil is clearly relevant to other -larger DC's
such as India and Mexico, currently attempting to develop indus-
trial and technolgical capacity to supply their own local markets.
In addition, the possibility of domestic small scale industry
entering the production of microelectronic equipment may well
be of relevance to smaller DC's with less ambitious objectives
towards overall industrial and technological capacity. Brazil's
experience in progressing from lower level peripheral and
transmission equipment through to sophisticated TDS exchange
technology is both relevant and encouraging to other DC's.
The second issue of considerable interest to other DC's
concerns the economic benefits gained by Brazil's progress in
Telecomms. While it was not possible here to conduct a formal
cost-benefit analysis, several major indicators demonstrate
beyond any doubt, the substantial benefits gained as a direct
result of Brazil's nationalisation of its domestic Telecomms
network, and local development of technology. Far from being
a drain on the country's resources the Telecomms sector overall
is largely self-financing and also an important source of revenue
for other Government activities. In addition total investments
in technology were extremely low in terms of gross operating
receipts, and indeed amounted to only a fraction of the resources
diverted from Telecomms to other sectors. In fact, the overall
operating company TELEBRAS occupies an almost unique position
among Brazilian State enterprises, with very high profit, very
low debt, falling imports, continuously increasing employment
and price increases far below the average rate of inflation.
Besides these direct and measurable benefits, the vital
economic and social gains from establishing a modern, well-
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functioning communications infrastructure should not be forgotten.
Brazil's success since 1974 in building a comprehensive Telecomms
infrastructure served the dual purpose of meeting the conventional
industrial and domestic demand for efficient communications,
and also layed the foundations for meeting the future demands
of information technology. Brazil's accumulation of digital
technology through its Telecomms infrastructure and supply industry
is an important component of the overall strategy of preventing
any possibility of a technology gap developing between Brazil
and the advanced economies, due to the diffusion of microelectronic
technology. Local enterprise has not only succeeded in acquiring
this technology but in fact has already produced a whole range
od digital innovations designed to suit local environmental and
economic conditions. The potential for other DC's to use the
Telecomms sector as a strategic means of accumulating a national
base in digital technologi is clearly an important matter for
policy consideration. At the same time the possibility of
adapting microelectronic technology to suit local needs may also
prove useful to other countries.
The third issue of general relevance is the role of
Government policy in ensuring domestic progress in Telecomms.
Rather than being the result of the invisible hand of the market
Brazil's progress was the direct consequence of the very "visible
hand" of Government policy intervention. Through a carefully
planned strategy of strengthening local enterprise and legislation
Brazil was able to ensure that the activities of the MNC's fitted
in with the overall Telecomms planning goals. This was achieved
mainly by centralising Telecomms purchasing power with TELEBRAS
who were then able to insist that technological activities were
located within the country. The other main function of Government
policy was to set up a major R&D centre in Telecomms to ensure,
directly, an independent base in digital Telecomms technology.
In addition, Government policy was instrumental in encouraging
the growth of the large number of new national firms currently
developing and manufacturing equipment for TELEBRAS.
Brazil's technological and infrastructural gains were
clearly the direct result of a well-orchestrated and vigorous
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Government policy, translated into economic reality by legislation
and administration. Although this experience cannot be transplanted
to other DC's, the Brazilian case does emphasise the need for
planning and organising local technological capacity to meet
specific infrastructural and industrial needs. In fact, probably
the most important lesson from the Brazilian experience in
Telecomms, for large and small DC's alike, is the need for
an informed and well-planned Government policy.
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GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS
ANALOGUE Electro-magnetic wave form used in transmission.
Analogous to a continuously variable physical quantity such as
temperature. Digital transmission on the other hand is transmitted
in discrete, separate pulses using Pulse Code Modulation (PCM).
COAXIAL CABLE A cable used for trunk transmission. The coaxial
outer sheath and central coil are both electrical conductors, separ-
ated from each other by an insulating material. Expensive to
install in relation to alternative systems such ag microwave relays,
optical fibres and satellites.
CROSSBAR Near obsolete, electromechanical switching system, used q
as an intermediate technology between Strowger and Electronic
exchanges.
DIGITAL A discrete or discontinuous signal transmitted in intervals.
Most modern computer and Telecommunications technology is now
based on digital data transmission because of its advantages over
analogue in terms of speed and low cost per bit of information.
The terms “digital” and "microelectronic" and sometimes "PCM"
are used interchangeably to describe digital Telecomms systems,
now converging technologically with computers.
EARTH STATION Used to receive and transmit signals in Satellite
transmission systems,
ELECTROMECHANICAL Semi-electronic, incorporating moving parts
unlike "solid-state" microelectronic systems.
ELECTRONIC MAIL Service providing data storage to a subscriber to
store messages received through a Telecomms network.
EXCHANGE EQUIPMENT Also known as switching equipment - represents
the heart of the Telecomms system, performing the central
operating function of connecting calls within and between networks.
HARDWARE The physical equipment and components required to build
a Telecomms, or any electronic system,
INFORMATICS Automated digital data processing systems incorporating
hardware and software, involving one or more computers, Based on
digital technology, the transmission of data is normally processed
using PCM techniques.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY The range of Telecomms, Telematics and
Informatics technologies, centred around microelectronic devices
which permit the storage, transmission and manipulation of data
in digital form at low cost and great speed.
INTELSAT The International Telecomms Satellite Organisation
responsible for providing over 60% of the world's overseas Telecomms
traffic.
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LASER TRANSMISSION Transmits signals through a modulated laser,
either through optical fibres or space.
LINE CONCENTRATOR A concentrator enables the signals from a
given number of telephones to be sent over one pair of wires
simultaneously - used in local telephone loops to achieve substant-
ial cost reductions.
LINE-OF-SIGHT Microwave transmission system in which a set of
receivers are located in a line to receive microwave signals,
without obstacles.
MICROELECTRONIC Any digital, solid-state semiconductor component.
MICROWAVE Very short electromagnetic radio wave, ithin the overall
wavelength spectrum of long, medium, short, infrared, ultraviolet,
X-ray and gamma ray.
MODEM Equipment for modulation and demodulation of Telecomms.
In other words it takes an analogue electrical signal and converts
it into a digital one, for rapid low-cost transmission.
MULTIPLEXOR A device which interfaces with a central exchange
and converts analogue into digital signals, then transmits them
using PCM techniques. Many telephone conversations and other
signals can be simultaneously transmitted by "interleaving" samples
of each signal, thereby increasing the capacity of existing
coaxial or microwave networks. Also the different types of signal
can be "multiplexed" together without interfering with each other,
unlike analogue.
OPTICAL FIBRES Used in PCM transmission, made of silica which is
much cheaper and more readily available than copper which is used
in conventional cables. Advantages over coaxial cables are: larger
capacity, resistance to corrosion but not to transmission signals
(therefore less signal regenerators or "boosters" needed). In
addition optical fibres can be installed with existing infrastructure
such as. coaxial ducts or railway lines.
PCM (PULSE CODE MODULATION) Digital transmission of information by
modulation of a pulse according to a code. (See analogue and
digital).
PACKET SWITCHING Used in data communications systems. Information
is stored in binary digits until line capacity is available for
transmission (the resulting data stream is termed "“packet") Has
been called an"electrical post office".
SATELLITE "A microwave relay in the sky" (Martin, 1977 p2ll).
Receives microwave signals and retransmits them to another location.
Satellites are used especially for intercontinental transmission,
and can handle large amounts of traffic with no cables or boosters
and send signals almost anywhere on earth.
SDS-SPC Space Division Swtching - Stored Programme Controlled
See TDS-SPC)
-66.
SOLID-STATE No moving parts, fully digital or electronic as
opposed to electromechanical.
SPC (STORED PROGRAMME CONTROLLED) A switching system whose internal
control is performed by a computer. (See TDS-SPC).
STROWGER Electromechanical telephone exchange invented in Kansas
in 1885, based on banks of rotary swtches connected in series -
slow, inflexible and costly in comparison with solid-state
electronic exchanges.
SWITCHING EQUIPMENT See exchange equipment.
TDS-SPC (TIME DIVISION SWITCHING-STORED PROGRAMME CONTROLLED)
TDS-SPC is the most recent digital swtching process . y whic
signals are transferred from one point to another by sending samples
down different paths, depending on their desired destination, at
exactly the right time, so that a particular "gate" opens allowing
the signals down a specific path, By changing the times at which
the gate opens different signals can be accepted. TDS is more
economical than conventional “space division switching" (SDS-SPC)
where the physical path is permanently connected,
TELEMATICS Also known as Teleinformatics (sometimes Comp-communic-
ations). Telematics is the fusion of Telecomms and Computer
technologies made possible by digital electronics. Data in digital
form 1s stored, manipulated and transmitted between computers
using public Telecomms transmission networks.
TRANSMISSION EQUIPMENT Includes microwave, satellite, coaxial
and more recently, fibre optic systems. Transmission equipment is
used to carry signals between terminals and includes local network
"loops" and long-haul of trunk systems,
TRANSPONDER Rented from INTELSAT, transponders accept signals in
a given frequency band and then retransmit them at different
frequencies so as not to interfere with weak incoming signals.
TROPOSCATTER A system of microwave transmission which utilises
the troposphere (the lower part of the Earth's atmosphere) to link
up receiving earth stations separated by larger distances than
allowed by line-of-sight transmission (infrequently used).
VIDEOTEXT TV sets are used as data terminals which are connected
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